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TUTKIMUSTIEDOTE                                                                                 JOENSUUN YLIOPISTO 
  
Tämä tutkielma käsittelee tapaa, miten Suomen ja Venäjän välisen rajan usein mainittu este-efekti sekä 
rajan asteittaisen aukeamisen mahdollistama vuorovaikutus havaitaan raja-alueyhteistyön parissa 
työskentelevien toimijoiden keskuudessa. Ottaen huomioon, että tämä tutkimus keskittyy nimenomaan 
havaintoihin, työn teoreettinen perusta pohjautuu sosiaalikonstruktiiviseen ajattelutapaan, jonka uskon 
johdattelevan minut oleellisimman tiedon lähteille. Viimeaikainen keskustelu raja sekä raja-alue 
tutkimuksen merkittävimmistä aiheista muodostavat analyyttisen viitekehyksen tämän tutkimuksen 
analyysille. Se koostuu useita ehdotuksista, jotka yhdessä antavat ymmärtää, että, ensi sijassa, rajat ovat 
kanssakäymisen esteitä. Rajoilla on useita eri rooleja, joista osa varsin vastustuskykyisiä muutoksille.     
 
Tämän tutkimuksen empiirinen aineisto koostuu 81 kyselylomakkeesta, jotka kerättiin alun perin 
EXLINEA tutkimusprojektia varten vuosina 2003–2004 Suomen puolelta Pohjois- ja Etelä Karjalasta 
sekä Venäjän puolelta Karjalan tasavallasta ja Leningradin alueelta. Tutkimuksen perusväittämä on, 
että huolimatta sen asteittaisesta aukeamisesta, Suomen ja Venäjän välinen raja sivuvaikutuksineen 
toimii yhä puolet toisistaan erottavan esteenä hankaloittaen samalla sen yli tapahtuvaa vuorovaikutusta. 
Ottaen huomioon rajan roolin, sen este-efekti ei kuitenkaan ole puhtaasti negatiivinen asia. Enemmistö 
rajan molemmin puolin kokee rajan itsessään tärkeäksi ja hyödylliseksi instituutioksi, joka on kuitenkin 
riittävän läpäisevä, jotta sen erottamat naapurit voivat tehdä molempia osapuolia hyödyttävää 
yhteistyötä.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
In the dynamics of internationalization and globalization geographical borders are more and more 
considered as challenges for further integration. Even though the representations and roles of borders 
are in flux, they still, in many ways, primarily represent barriers rather than bridges. Borders do not 
only demarcate sovereignty, but also symbolize important values and identities. This tension between 
borders as ‘meeting-places’ and borders ‘cut-off lines’ has made the role of borders more critical than 
ever before – especially in the European context. 
 
Even if geographical realities do not change, their meaning for different purposes will. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union and Finland’s entry to the EU can be seen as the main factors that have altered the 
geopolitical setting between the two countries. The subsequent gradual opening of an essentially closed 
border between Finland and Russian Federation1 as well as the formation of new forms of interaction 
between the countries reveal the political, cultural and economic inequalities and, most notably, makes 
them more tangible for people – especially for those involved in cross-border activities.  
 
1.2 Background 
The allegedly high barrier effect, attributed to the age of closure, set the scene not only for the 
formation of the socio-economic division between the two countries, but also branded its mark in the 
minds of people for years to come. The multifaceted, complex gap has a number of side effects. It is 
widely understood that there exists a number of fundamental problems that need to be overcome when 
working towards bridging the gap and the construction of more harmonious and equal co-operation that 
would benefit both sides. These disparities, however, are often considered to be the main impediment 
to the intended development of the both sides of the border. 
 
The Finnish-Russian border serves today as a rather “peaceful reminder of contrasting but accepted 
differences”, rather than a “source of friction between competing political entities”, to use Knight’s 
(1991, xvii) expressions. However, the border is more than just a monument, and exerts visible effects 
on people’s current patterns of movement and on their evaluation of what lies on the other side.  
                                                 
1
 The Russian Federation is hereafter referred to as Russia. 
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The tumultuous past of the border region, out of which several problems may be seen originally to stem 
from, plays an exceedingly important role in maintaining the function of the border as a barrier for 
interaction. Even though I will not delve deep into international relations, it would be foolish to 
separate individual actors bluntly from the larger communities (nations, states) that they are a part of. 
Especially so when it seems that the nation-state, and its position in contemporary geopolitics, happens 
to be still in the heart of the discussion about the open border paradox.  
 
Due to the profound changes that occurred during the last two decades, the Finnish-Russian border is 
now gradually opening and, in consequence, obtaining again new functions. Perhaps most noticeably, it 
is establishing its role as an area of contact and interaction. Cross-border co-operation (CBC) practices 
have been initiated to diminish the differences between the two countries. However, this process has 
proven to be difficult due to the very same factors that it strives to defeat, i.e. the differences between 
these two countries. Newman’s (2003, 130) argument that “the longer they [borders] remain in situ, the 
harder they are to remove or change” seems to be valid and overshadows the claim that humans interact 
most with those to whom they are the closest – the axiom being that the way in which a border is 
perceived affects the volume of interaction across the border. 
 
1.3 Aims of the Research 
The present study derives from the background outlined above. Its aim is to examine how the people 
involved in CBC practices across the Finnish-Russian border perceive the barrier effect of the border as 
well as its gradual opening and subsequent implications. The Finnish-Russian border also has the 
reputation of being a mental border with a high barrier effect. This claim is, however, often taken as a 
given without further examination of its validity. The basic logic behind the current EU policies that 
borders are barriers and barriers are to be removed follows a clear logic, but is contained with 
enormous assumptions (cf. van Houtum 1999b, 329). It has become common to argue that not all the 
borders are barriers and those that are should not necessarily be removed.     
 
This study aims to clarify how the selected group of actors involved in CBC practices at the Finnish-
Russian border perceives the height of the barrier effect of the border and which factors contribute to 
the potential barrier effect. The identification of the main obstacles is outwardly descriptive, yet serves 
also deeper purposes. To remove or at least to reduce the barrier effect of the border, the factors 
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erecting the barrier have to be identified before they can be tackled. In addition, the potential 
differences between the perspective of the Finnish and Russian actors will be clarified.  
 
The degree of the barrier effect is closely liked with the intensity of CBC, cross-border interaction 
(CBI), and flows in general. Consequently, the gradual opening of the border has resulted in more 
diverse and intensive interaction across the border. However, given that CBC is an important EU policy 
instrument, it has acquired the reputation of an ‘elite activity’. Thus, it is crucial to find out whether the 
developments at the Finnish-Russian border are actually perceived to be beneficial and useful by the 
people who have gained practical experience in CBC/CBI. This, then, has a crucial impact on the future 
prospects not only of the co-operation but also of the overall development of the border regions.    
  
The following interlinked research questions have been formulated: 
1. What is the perceived height of the barrier effect of the Finnish-Russian border and, more 
specifically, which factors are perceived to contribute to this effect? 
 
2. How is greater interaction, in general, and its impact, in particular, perceived at the 
Finnish-Russian border? 
 
The task is tackled by identifying both the factors, which are perceived as main barriers for interaction 
and the fields that are perceived to be unburdened by a high barrier effect. Barriers can be interpreted 
as obstacles that need to be the target of future CBC policies and practices. The latter group then could, 
following the logic of ‘go across where the fence is the lowest’, function as the easiest area for 
encouraging co-operation. 
 
The impact of the interaction is included in this study deriving from the assumption that favorable 
actions and practices are easier to maintain than those that are perceived as unfavorable or not useful. 
On this basis, it is essential to assess whether or not CBC is seen as desirable, or as a value in itself, at 
all. Most of the recent texts on CBC have discussed the topic only at the official level, which has only 
reinforced its reputation as an elite activity. This, also, has had serious impacts on the way CBC is 
viewed by those who feel excluded. In order to function, co-operation requires planning and 
preparation, which again requires information – not only statistical, but also insight into how actors 
involved perceive the situation. These actors the most aware of practical problems and conventions 
and, thus, study of their perceptions is necessary in order to test the efficiency of images and ideas that 
are constantly being created and recreated by governments, foreign policy elites, and also by the mass 
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media. In order to work together, we should know each other. That is why I will also attempt to clarify 
the images of the ‘other’ as a partner for such practices. 
 
1.4 Research Area 
The present study builds on the data originally collected for EXLINEA2 research project (for more 
detailed information, see section 5.1). The data used was collected in 2003-2004 on the Finnish side 
from Joensuu, Tohmajärvi, and Kitee in North Karelia and Imatra and Lappeenranta in South Karelia 
and on the Russian side of the border from Sortavala and Petrozavodsk in the Republic of Karelia and 
Svetogorsk and Vyborg in the Leningrad region (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The research area. 
All regions come in contact with the Finnish-Russian border, which can be currently crossed at three 
different locations within the research area. Both sides of the border can be regarded as peripheral 
                                                 
2
 EXLINEA (“Lines of Exclusion as Arenas of Co-operation: Reconfiguring the External Boundaries of Europe – Policies, 
Practices, Perceptions”) research project investigates the emerging conditions for cross-border co-operation and interaction 
on the European Union’s external borders. It has done this by employing a multilevel analytical framework that allows for 
the scrutiny of policies, practices and perceptions as they affect the ability and propensity of local-level actors to engage in 
cross-border co-operation See Exlinea 2005; van Houtum & Scott 2006; Scott & Matzeit 2006. 
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areas, burdened by their location next to a practically closed border. The area will be introduced in 
more detail in chapter 5. 
 
1.5 The Key Concepts of the Study 
1.5.1 Perception, Values, and Attitudes 
Perceptions are created through various processes of interpreting, developing awareness and 
understanding what is received through the senses and sensory experiences. For my purposes, 
perceptions are defined as the “cognitive and ideological elements that affect the manner in which the 
political roles of border regions and cross-border co-operation is interpreted” (Scott & Matzeit 2006, 
25). In this respect, perceptions are affected by political discourse, public discussion in the media and 
civil society, by actors’ opinions, by local sentiment (Ibid.), and more generally by personal attitudes, 
feelings, and images people have of different places, environments, peoples or their actions. 
 
The mental images of places locations are called perceptual, cognitive or mental maps (Tolman 1948) – 
and, thus, the images of where a border is located are called cognitive or mental borders (cf. van 
Houtum 1998, 39–42; 1999). Furthermore, also the perceptions of future opportunities and future 
prospects are derived from these mental constructs, which makes them important in determining the 
dynamics of change (North 1997). Naturally, perception of the same or similar events or objects varies 
from person to person as an individual’s perception is influenced by numerous factors, such as his or 
her own level of education, social and economic background, and life experiences. 
 
Values are person’s or social group’s deeply held beliefs in which they have an affective or emotional 
regard, either for or against something (Suhonen 1988, 15–20). Values may also consist of principles, 
standards, or qualities that are considered to be worthwhile or desirable. If the characteristics of an 
object coincide with one’s values, the object is regarded as more desirable, important, or useful. 
Peoples’ values are demonstrated through his or hers day-to-day behavior, whereas values are set forth 
as expectations of behavior (cf. Fishbein & Ajzen 1975). 
 
Attitudes, then, are derived from values. The attitude of a person tells how he or she feels about the 
subject-matter. According to Fishbein & Ajzen (1975, 6), three basic features of attitudes are: “the 
notion that attitude is learned, that it predisposes action, and that such actions are consistently favorable 
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or unfavorable toward the object”. Attitudes differ from values, because they are narrower, less 
profound, and less resistant to change (Allardt 1983, 53).     
 
Within the field of geography, perceptions have been mainly examined from the behavioral point of 
view. The main focus of the behavioral approach has been to explore the ways in which information is 
acquired, interpreted, and used in decision-making (Abler, Adams & Gould 1971); i.e. perceptions and 
values have been regarded as motivators of behavior. The significance of human perception has not, 
however, been the main focus of the border studies, as economic factors have eclipsed the subject of 
perception. Despite its humanistic practicality, the positivist orientation of behavioral approaches, and 
its intermittent ignorance of the influence of institutional causality (i.e. political and economic causal 
relationships), has been criticized (Ernel & Peet 1989, 52). Criticism has also been directed towards the 
notion that behavioral approaches have ignored the fundamental sources of values, as well as the 
processes that uphold these belief systems (Ibid.).       
1.5.2 The Contested Concept of Border 
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, “it means just what I 
choose it to mean, neither more nor less”. “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can 
make words mean so many different things”. “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, 
“which is to be master - that's all”. (Lewis Carroll - Through the Looking Glass, C.vi) 
 
The concept of border is ambiguous and complex; it has several different, but related meanings. For 
example, the Finnish word raja has several and multiform meanings, each of which has its own specific 
term in English. Instead of just ‘borders’, in English, we can speak of ‘boundaries’, ‘edges’ or 
‘frontiers’ depending on whether we are referring to a precise demarcation line, to a margin where an 
area ends and another begins, or an extreme limit of an entity. No strict rules, however, exist and the 
concepts are used fairly interchangeably (see Kristof 1959, 270; Prescott 1978, 29; Cohen 1994, 63). 
However, no matter how they are called, all borders “create compartments within which some are 
included and many excluded” (Newman 2003, 123) – and, thus, function more often as barriers than 
bridges. In the political sense, a border consists of a margin around the edge of an entity, sovereignly 
governed by a supreme power. Nevertheless, mental, symbolic, cultural, ethnic, and virtual borders 
may have as significant of a function as actual political lines drawn on the map.  
 
In this study, border is seen as an artificial social and cultural construction. Such an understanding is 
based on the work of Paasi (see e.g. 1996; 2000; 2003), who has underlined that borders should not be 
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viewed from the perspective of static territorial lines, but should rather be understood from a broader 
socio-cultural perspective which puts emphasis on the production and reproduction of territories and 
boundaries, and their symbolic meanings in discourses and institutional practices that occur on all 
spatial scales, from local to global. His argument is based on the notion that borders are both symbols 
and institutions that produced distinctions between social groups and are produced by them. The 
formation of borders is a continuous process that manifests not only power, but also socio-spatial 
consciousness in social practices and discourses: in politics, administration, economics, culture, or the 
organization of ethnic relations (Paasi 1996). Like institutions and discourses, borders are not ‘located’ 
only in the border areas, but have ‘spread’ everywhere into society. Borders are therefore one part of 
what Paasi has labeled as the discursive landscape of social power that exists in social practices and 
relations. (ibid.) 
 
Furthermore, borders have an effect on how we behave in different circumstances and how we perceive 
the places and areas that surround us (Hallikainen 2003, 18). On the other hand, the effect of the border 
depends on the capability of people and regional systems to cross the border, which in itself depends on 
the characteristics of the border (van der Schelde & Hœkveld 1992, 483).  
1.5.3 Barrier effect 
Barrier is defined as any condition or action that hinders or restricts free movement and interaction of 
people, capital, products, services, ideas, etc. The barrier effect, then, is the negative effect on border 
exchanges between territories (De Boe et al. 1999, 36). The effect underlines differences between two 
countries and the lack of spatial integration between them. A barrier effect exists when the intensity of 
a certain form of interaction suddenly drops where a border is crossed due to the characteristics of the 
border (Rietveld 1993, 49; 2001, 83). Such a discontinuity can generate difficulties for CBC, in the 
sense that differences in behavior, cultural and linguistic background or in socio-economic level can 
reduce the possibilities of relationships and interaction. On the other hand, a high barrier effect may be 
seen as catalyst for increased co-operation in the sense that the ‘differential’ they provide or the 
‘complementarity’ they show can encourage flows between areas (De Boe et al. 1999, 17).  
1.5.4 Co-operation and Interaction  
Most of the definitions of cross-border or transborder co-operation and interaction are highly case 
specific. According to Anderson (2000, 201), CBC refers to the co-operation between units of 
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government below the national level3 and the associated professional associations, citizens’ 
organizations and interest groups. On the other hand, The European Commission (2000, 11) has stated 
that the ‘philosophy’ of CBC is: 
…that of a genuinely joint cooperation between two neighbouring border regions. Joint 
cross-border cooperation does not mean that one partner initially acts alone at national 
level and later tries to involve or cooperate with the neighbour across the border. It 
encompasses all areas of daily life and development of joint programmes, priorities and 
actions. It also includes extensive involvement of social groups, administrative levels and 
so on in cross-border cooperation.  
 
With regard to co-operation ‘beyond borders’, the European Commission (2000, 15) distinguishes three 
types of co-operation: cross-border, interregional and trans-national cooperation. Given that the topic of 
this study is not the co-operation per se, but the perceptions of it, it is neither necessary nor useful to 
use such a strict distinction. Hence, I will use the term cross-border co-operation (CBC) more generally 
to refer to all kinds of co-operation that takes place across the border.  
 
The distinction between ‘co-operation’ and ‘interaction’ must, however, be made. Though interaction is 
a joint activity or a communication between partners, the ultimate goal or the rationale behind chosen 
actions may differ. In co-operation, however, partners are typically working towards a shared goal and 
mutual benefits. Furthermore, interaction may occur between a subject and an object, whereas co-
operation refers to practices between two, at least somewhat, equal subjects. 
 
1.6 Structure of the Study 
This work consists of 7 chapters. Following the introductory chapter 1, chapter 2 presents a 
philosophical framework with epistemological and ontological choices on which my understanding and 
argumentation is based. This is then followed by considerations of the broader field of study related to 
international relations and interaction, geopolitics, and the utmost driving force behind it, nationalism. 
Chapter 3 outlines the analytical framework used to form the study’s hypothesis. Chapter 4 provides 
information on the Finnish-Russian border and border region and in chapter 5 introduces the research 
material and explains it utilization. Chapter 6 includes an analysis of the data as well as the findings. 
Finally, chapter 7, discusses these findings, judges the validity of hypothesis, and draws the final 
conclusions.   
                                                 
3
 Anderson (2000, 201) points also out that central governments are inevitably involved as facilitators of, and constraints on 
this form of co-operation.  
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2 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL STARTING POINT 
There is no objectivity that is free of values (Häkli 1999, 157). In the following, the chosen standpoint, 
as well as the theoretical underpinnings and reasoning related to the epistemological choices behind it, 
will be explained and reasoned. Furthermore, I will shed light on the ‘big stories’ of geopolitics and 
nationalism, which have played a crucial role in the formation and development of the Finnish-Russian 
relations. 
2.1 Social Constructivism  
Constructivist approaches emphasize normative and cognitive elements, including individual’s 
perceptions, preferences and identities, in social processes (Blatter & Clement 2000a, 86), examine 
how actors and structures are interrelated, and how actors intermediate structures (Keisala 1994, 87). 
Simply put, social constructivism acknowledges the existence of an external reality, but realizes also 
that cognizing beings can never know what the reality is actually like (Tobin & Tippins 1993, 4). Thus, 
the role of the researcher is perhaps altered from ‘truth seeker’ to ‘learner’ (Ibid, 15).  
 
Knowledge of reality is gained through social and cultural activities (Gredler 1997; Prawat & Floden 
1994). Hence, reality is understood, as Häkli (1999, 133) has put it, as ordinary members of a society 
interpret it. Members of a society themselves invent properties of the world as they create meanings 
through interactions with each other and with their environment (Kukla 2000). The knowledge gained 
from such social activities is the outcome of active processes of fabrication, rather than the discovery of 
a pre-existent and fully formed reality (Gregory et al. 2000, 748). Therefore, knowledge is always 
profoundly relative to its social setting and discourse. This perspective privileges culture and context, 
as the foundation of knowledge. Knowledge, then, is not merely socially constructed, but perpetually 
co-constructed by language and culture. Vygotsky, a constructivist pioneer, provides an example of 
how an individual’s naked perceptual field is layered with additional meaning through language and 
culture. Vygotsky (1978, 39) states: 
A special feature of human perception…is the perception of real objects…I do not see the 
world simply in color and shape but also as a world with sense and meaning. I do not merely 
see something round and black with two hands; I see a clock… 
 
Paasi’s substantial work “Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness”, published in 1996, is an 
influential example of the use of a social constructivist framework within the field of border studies. 
Paasi (1996) analyzes people’s everyday reproduction of borders. He combines the analyses of 
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structural features and processes with the knowledge emerging from local social settings and contexts. 
He also emphasizes repeatedly that representations, such as maps, are cultural texts, which help to 
construct the world, rather than just mirror it. Despite its widespread acclaim, Paasi’s work has also 
received criticism. For instance Strüver (2003, 8–9) claims that Paasi’s writings remain rooted in rather 
classical social constructivism and focus on mimetic representations. She also argues that “Paasi’s 
social constructivist understanding of ‘representations’ is rather limited to carriers of meaning” and that 
“[t]he productive site of an audience’s reception and interpretation of representations remain 
unrecognized”.  
2.1.1 Knowledge is Power? 
The specific discourse, within which research is carried out, actually constructs the topic itself. It 
defines and produces the objects of knowledge and it governs the way the topic is discussed. As 
Foucault has argued on several occasions, nothing meaningful exists outside of discourse – nothing has 
meaning outside of discourse (see Foucault 1972; 1980). The dominant discourse that frames this 
study, for example, is the discussion of the changing role of regional actors in terms of decision-making 
power as the role of the nation-state declines.  
 
One might question, however, what meaningful knowledge actually is, and who has the power to define 
it. I believe that power is also socially produced. It is not to say that physical things and actions do not 
exist, but that they only become meaningful and objects of knowledge within a specific discourse 
(Foucault 1972, 116–117). Exaggeratedly, it may be said, that the authority does not have to be the 
‘truth’, if it has the power to make itself true – not the truth of knowledge in the absolute sense, but 
rather of a discursive formation sustaining a regime of truth (see Foucault 1980). These questions are of 
utmost importance when it comes to the CBC practices at the Finnish-Russian border. True co-
operation that is beneficial for both sides must be based on mutual interest and commonly accepted 
rules. In the past, the game has been played according to EU norms, in which Russia has often been an 
object rather that a subject, with the EU having power over funding procedures. Power and knowledge 
can never be monopolized by a single actor, such as state (Finland, Russia) or centre (the EU/Brussels, 
Moscow), but rather exists in relations between actors.  
2.1.2 Reasons for the Chosen Standpoint 
Social structuralism enables this study to access to relevant knowledge about the people’s perceptions 
towards, and the interrelations with, those socially and historically produced structures that they may 
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regard as delimiting their space. Perceptions of the other and of interaction with the other are more 
likely to improve if integration with like-minded regions or states is seen as valuable and useful for the 
people living in the border regions. Increasing the balance of power in the favor of each state or region 
separately is not a silver bullet. Productive interaction and co-operation occur when both sides strive 
for greater synergy and achieving mutual interests. Positive attitudes and relationships are, thus, not 
only the result of interaction and co-operation, but also their prerequisite. 
 
For this reason, I veered away from more liberal approaches, which would easily accommodate for 
regionalism and cross-border flows, but adhere to state-driven practices in integration processes and, 
thus, fail to understand both the social bottom-up elements in production of such constructions and the 
values, attitudes, and identities of the people, which ultimately determine regional or state interests. I 
also avoided the postmodernist emphasis of the interplay of pluralities in discursive practices and all 
the possible worlds for being overly polyphonic and fragmented. Social constructivism avoids being 
overly idealistic, while also rejecting the realist deal of ‘get-as-much-power-as-you-can’ in terms of 
power division between different actors or spatial scales.  
 
Different regions and states may have different preferences, depending on such factors as culture, 
economic system or government type. Käkönen (2000, 1) has pointed out that conflicts mostly occur 
between actors whose interest are related to the same object(s) or, on the other hand, between actors 
with contrasting interests. He relies on Mitranian classical functionalism and claims that “by 
international cooperation nations become interdependent and that finally leads to world peace” (Ibid, 
2). According to the more neo-functionalists way of thinking, the process is not that straightforward, as 
at each integration level, certain ‘spillover effects’ will be gained, creating again more integration and 
more reasons for integration. These once made patterns are, however, hardly strong enough to uphold 
such practices. In contrast, states and regions are more likely to co-operate, when they see themselves 
as sharing common values, interests, belief systems, or a common identity and/or culture. 
 
2.2 The Geography of Imagination 
The territorial restructuring of the former Soviet Union (USSR), as well as the remarkable changes that 
has occurred on the Finnish side of the border, has unmistakably altered the geopolitics of Northern 
Europe. When approaching perceptions and images of the other, against which the border is drawn, the 
forces evoking and upholding these belief systems ought not to be neglected. Even though Russia is not 
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the clear-cut successor of the USSR – at least in a political sense, studies focusing on Russia have had 
to face the ghost of the USSR that still continues to haunt both the political rhetoric and general 
imagination concerning Russia and Russianness (O’Loughlin & Talbot 2005, 23). 
 
In this light, I am referring to a concept of ‘metageographies’, introduced by Lewis and Wigen (1997) 
and understood as the geographical structures that people use to order everyday long-term spatial 
information. These structures are based on perceptions, experiences, and myths that, for the most part, 
go unexamined. Related to this, I accept the Ó Tuathail’s (2002) notion about ‘geopolitical codes’4 that 
are passed on to the public through special kind of ‘scripts’ or performances that impart a conditioned 
way of viewing a situation or region. Governments, geopolitical intellectuals, and foreign policy elites 
use these kinds of codes to promote specific agendas or actions “that could in turn mobilize public 
opinion to influence those actions” (O’Loughling & Talbot 2005, 26).    
 
By asking whether the people are willing to adopt the geo-visions of the official level or whether their 
perceptions and preferences hinder the actions of state or a smaller unit, we come to the core of what 
Kolossov (2003) has named ‘low geopolitics’; i.e. how ordinary people feel about their own country, its 
neighbors, and their place in the world. As O’Loughlin & Talbot (2005, 27) have pointed out, all such 
feelings are shaped by the metageographies that people carry with them. Feelings are based on what is 
perceived and on the knowledge that is collected through perception, but also on ignorance, 
stereotypes, and prejudices.   
 
This geopolitical vision, defined as “any idea concerning the relation between one’s own and other 
places, involving feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective 
mission or foreign policy strategy” by Dijkink (1996, 10), of the people, then, is one of the main 
components of the image of an other or of CBC with the other. Nevertheless, such a vision may or may 
not match with the reality or a ‘normative preference’ (O’Loughlin &Talbot 2005, 27).  
 
The significance of nationalism (see section 2.4.2) lies in its power not only to uphold these belief 
systems, but also mould a territory into ‘national space’. It affects not only the people living within the 
territory, but also those in neighboring territories who must re-conceptualize and re-construct the 
adjoining spaces, and either accept or reject the national assertion of others upon those places 
                                                 
4
 A geopolitical code is a set of assumptions that the state apparatus uses to evaluate other states and regions beyond its 
borders (Taylor 1993; see also Dijkink 1998). 
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(O’Loughlin & Talbot 2005, 28-29). Peoples’ emotional attachment to places, and their perceptions and 
feelings about particular places give them meanings (Ibid.). This is what Agnew (1987) has termed as a 
‘sense of place’ in contrast to mere ‘place as location’. The history of a nation, its struggles, conflicts, 
defining moments, and tragedies all happen in particular places, but they also have an influence on how 
the place is experienced. Furthermore, as O’Loughlin & Talbot (2005, 29) have observed, these 
incidents also shape the character of the whole nation as well. 
 
2.3 The Return of Geopolitics 
Geopolitics has had a significant impact on the setting of Finnish-Russian relations. Even though 
contemporary scholars of global politics have questioned the central role of the state, the border is still 
the central defining and demarcating element that distinguishes states – and, thus, the belief that 
globalization heralds the end of the nation-state seems to be disingenuous. Several new factors, such as 
international capital, multinational corporations, international organizations and religious as well as 
ideological movements undoubtedly affect the composition of regions and states. Furthermore, mutual 
interests and common threats may function as an additional impetus. However, the formerly popular 
regional agenda projected, for example, by Joenniemi (e.g. 2000) appears, especially in the Russian 
case, to be nothing but wishful thinking. Therefore, it is not groundless to argue that nations as actors 
are coming back to focus, necessitating the discussion of the relations between them. 
  
Geopolitics has evolved and a great many grand ideas presented earlier have become invalid and 
useless, and ought to be questioned. Despite modern scholars’ attempts at updating, modern geopolitics 
has fallen from time to time to look back to a former geopolitical mindset5. Fortunately, there has been 
growing interest in geopolitical research, which has also witnessed contributions from outside the 
discipline by increasing number of scholars. Subsequently, the borders of the field of study have 
expanded. The definition of geopolitics has lately been determined by the discipline that each writer 
represents and by the theoretic-methodological principles that they choose to follow within that 
discipline. Even so, geopolitics is still the study of the relationships between a nation and the rest of the 
world; a definition, which derives clearly from the traditional assumption that each nation has its own 
sphere of influence within which it exerts power over surrounding nations. 
                                                 
5
 For example, the argument that the state borders in postcolonial Africa are arbitrary and for that reason potential stimuli 
for conflicts and instabilities, is abundantly based on the observation that they are not congruent with ethnically or 
geographically determined, ‘natural’ borders. For a review of geopolitics’ role in border studies, see van Houtum (2005). 
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Moreover, geopolitics has become more ‘critical’, which may be taken as an aspiration to link 
geopolitics into wider traditions of critical research (Moisio 2001). Critical geopolitics’ way to 
understand geopolitics derives from the presumption that geographical knowledge by its nature is a 
form of power (see Ó Tuathail 1996). Its endeavor has been to tear old historical concepts apart from 
their contexts. This, and the situation at the Finnish-Russian border in mind, we can ask: are we bound 
to remain trapped in historically conditioned structures or is conscious transformation possible? 
 
2.4 A Notion about Nationalism and Multileveled Relations  
Nationalism has been a crucial socio-cultural phenomenon during the last 200 years, setting the scene 
for its derivative, a nation-state, to became the principal way to divide the Earth’s surface – and, 
consequently, to one of the most popular research topics in political geography. Moreover, nationalism 
is related to national interests. It may be used to enforce the sphere of power, but also to challenge it. 
Even though nationalism may not anymore be en vogue, it is nevertheless always present to some 
extent. It has become especially visible in such activities as CBC, which has most often played by the 
rules of international relations.  
 
Even if CBC policies, in principle, stipulate neutrality, in practice that is, however, often demanding 
and overly idealistic to maintain. Actions that are considered to be in the nation’s interests are most 
often portrayed and interpreted as justified and acceptable – this is a known and often-used strategy. As 
soon as there is a threat to national interests and, thus, to national self-consciousness, the time of 
protectionism sets in. Such an elite activity as CBC is a prime example of this. Co-operation is 
portrayed and interpreted as a positive objective most likely if it is considered to be beneficial for the 
nation. Given that co-operation by definition requires at least two participants, it is more likely to 
succeed if it is perceived to be in the interests of both of them. What is essential for the topic of the 
present study is that ideologies, such as nationalism, and its reflections and derivatives are not 
necessarily right or wrong, but they help to construct meaning in the given context, are charged with 
emotions and, hence, uphold the belief systems that people have about their own country and its 
neighbors. 
 
When discussing the opening of the border and its implications we have to be aware of the broader 
context in which the process takes place. A constantly widening and deepening integration process, 
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strengthening regionalization, and the raising influence of international organizations, and economic 
globalization have undoubtedly shaken the role of nation-state.  
 
Several impacts of globalization have special relevance for this study. These include 1) institutional 
crumbling of borders, 2) compaction of cross-border social relations, 3) increased interdependence, and 
4) growth of cross-border activities. The intensification of each of these is a reality that is unlikely to 
fade away in the foreseeable future, which then again is likely to open new doors for transnational 
interaction. Moreover, the shift of political authority from the national level to the regional (Europe of 
Regions), supranational (the EU), or global level has received a fair amount of attention in the 
contemporary discussions. An alternative approach to the topic has been to consider society as a 
functional network of regional and global flows (Lash & Urry 1994; Vartiainen 1997). Castells (1996) 
has argued that networks should be seen as a new space for social interaction, which is not only the 
gradual extension of historical trends, but also has its own novel characteristics and dynamics.  
 
As a consequence of these transformations the conceptions of nation and state has grown dimmer in 
people’s minds. All this does not by any chance mean that nationalism is not anymore prominent in 
world politics, but it has rather became “historically less important” (Hobsbawm 1990, 181). Thus, it 
would be imprudent to allege that contemporary scholars of global politics have questioned the central 
role of the state without reason (Anderson, Brook & Cochrane 1995; Blake 1994; Demko & Wood 
1994; Ohmae 1995). On the other hand, however, borders seem to be still, without question, the central 
element that distinguishes states. Despite growing centrifugal forces, the nation-state is likely to endure 
as an idealistic mode of organization. One could argue that instead of disappearing, the nation-state has 
merely changed its institutional form. Nation-states appear drawn on the political map of the word in 
such a permanent manner that, at times, they may seem even as ‘natural’ formations (Anderson 1995, 
70). The fact is that the majority of people still want to belong to a certain nation, making nationalism 
an exceedingly valid driving force in any kind of international activity. 
 
After tearing down the Iron Curtain, the geographical discussion about the Finnish-Russian border has 
been predominantly fuelled by the changing meanings of the border as well as the future prospects of 
Finland as a nation-state. Even though the opposition, which existed between East and West during the 
Cold War, has (been) almost entirely diffused, it is not surprising, as Eskelinen, Liikanen & Oksa 
(1999, 1) have pointed out, that the complete disappearance of these age-old political-cultural 
differences will take time. 
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2.5 The Implications 
My approach is, following Paasi’s (1996) example, to combine ‘big stories’ of nationalism and 
geopolitics with the ‘small narratives’ of daily experiences along the border. The often-cited socio-
economic gap at the border – even if more complex than it is usually thought – is a reality and has 
actually grown since the collapse of the USSR. The gap has evolved as the result of historical 
processes, and continuity is one of its inherent characteristics (Alanen & Eskelinen 2000, 57). 
Perception, then, takes place through a socio-cultural filter and the subsequently formed knowledge, 
instead of being purely personal, is socially produced and being continuously reproduced. In this 
respect, the reality – or the relevant knowledge of it – is actively created by social interactions and 
relationships. These interactions, in turn, alter the way in which the given object, such as the border or 
interaction across it, is perceived and valued. 
 
Such a specific topic requires specific research methods that are holistic and flexible enough for 
understanding the multilateral meanings and representations that it aims to clarify. However, the wider 
context linkages, the ideologies behind peoples’ perceptions, ought not to be neglected either. 
 
All this makes my task an interpretive one. I am aware that it is impossible for me to know the meaning 
of somebody else’s precise background and life experience. Even though the data available for the 
present study does not allow me to draw well-reasoned conclusions why the people perceive what they 
perceive, I may however discuss the factors that may have affected the formation of these perceptions 
It cannot, however, go unnoticed that my own worldview, values, and beliefs become a part of the 
constructions and representations of meaning that I am describing in this particular context. Even if 
unapologetically, this makes the present study utterly subjectivist.  
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3 ANALYTICAL APPROACHES  
Van der Velde and van Houtum (2000) have identified three dominant and influential debates in 
borders studies: “Borders and flows”, “Border regions and cross-border cooperation”, and “People and 
the construction of border”. For the reason that the present study incorporates all of them, the 
remaining part following the overview is divided into three corresponding sections, each of which 
introduces the research topic by giving examples of the most relevant studies, models, typologies, 
concepts, and theories for the purpose of the present work. The most useful of these are, then, used in 
section 3.5 to form the hypotheses for the analysis of the present study.   
 
3.1 Overview 
Borders have been one of the most central topics in political geography for a long time (Mignhi 1963; 
Prescott 1987; Paasi 1999a; Newman 2003). However, a lot has changed since Ratzel (1897) developed 
the pioneering framework for early border studies. Border studies has developed in relation to the 
predominant geopolitical models and visions. The widely used, but a “fundamentally illogical” 
(Hartshorne 1936, 57) division of ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ borders came to an end, when political 
geographers began to emphasize that all political borders are consequences of conscious choices and, 
thus, artificial (Kristoff 1959; Prescott 1987; Paasi 1999a, 12–13). Accordingly, the focus of border 
studies shifted from studying borders as delimiters of territorial control and ideology towards “areal 
differentiation”, as characterized by Harsthorne (1936, 56–57; 1950, 128). He understood that the 
geodeterministic mindset of the German tradition of Anhtropographie had served to discredit Political 
Geography and proposed that the analysis of the functioning of the state would provide a meaningful 
context for scientific rigor (Hartshorne 1950, 129).  
 
Unfortunately, the dynamic role of borders was overlooked before long and borders as a research topic 
remained to be neglected until the 1980s, when the predominant geopolitical atmosphere directed 
research interests back to borders. The tearing down the East-West division at the end of the Cold War 
finally ensured a shift back to borders and border regions. This increased attention, as Paasi (1999a; 
2005) has remarked, is fairly paradoxical since the role of the borders is said to been in decline. On the 
other hand, van Houtum (2000a, 1) has declared that it may be already a cliché to state that such forces 
as the EU integration and the opening of the Iron Curtain have inspired the huge increase in scientific 
attention. The situation becomes obvious when the studies on the Finnish-Russian border are examined. 
 25 
In addition to numerous separate articles and other publications, working papers, and such, several 
influential volumes, consisting of a wide-range of articles related to the topic, have been published as to 
manifest van Houtum’s claim6. 
 
3.2 Borders and Flows 
The flow approach has mostly occurred in the field of European regional science, particularly when 
studying the economic development of border regions. It underlines the impact of the border on the 
flows of goods, labor, and capital across the border. (Van Houtum 2000a, 1–2.) Borders have various 
implications for spatial interaction (Rietveld 2001, 79; cf. Ratti & Reichman 1993). Predominantly, 
however, borders are seen as barriers that hinder integration and potential flows between, increasing the 
relative distance between the two sides. As a consequence, the volume of economic as well as social 
interaction across the border tends to be dramatically lower across the border than within the state. 
3.2.1 Border as a Barrier 
There exist various reasons for the existence of the border barrier effect. According to Rietveld (1993, 
49; 2001, 83), the most important of these are: 1) weak or expensive transport infrastructure service 
links; 2) consumer preference for domestic rather than foreign products and destinations; 3) 
government interventions; and 4) lack of information on foreign countries. Apart from consumer 
preferences, all of these may have both monetary and time effects (Rieveld 2001, 84–86); the border 
crossings entail extra costs and/or time. Consumer preference may be based on taste, language or ethnic 
and cultural differences. Peschel (1992, 8) has also concluded that in addition to distance-bridging costs 
in transport and communication, linguistic and cultural dissimilarities, as well as differences in the 
scope of social and political life, political influences may deliberately or unintentionally result in the 
further separation of countries. 
 
Alanen & Eskelinen (2000) have examined the border’s impact on economic actors and activities. They 
suggest that borders are primarily institutional obstacles for potential economic activities (see also 
Knox & Agnew 1989/1994, 65–106; Nijkamp et al. 1990; Batten & Nijkamp 1990; Janssen 2000; 
Blatter 2004). This kind of thinking may be linked to the works of Lösch (1940/1954, 196–20; cf. 
                                                 
6
 For example, “The Curtains of Iron and Gold” edited by Eskelinen, Liikanen & Oksa (1999) examines the construction of 
new political, economic, and mental borders in post-Cold War Europe, “Tearing Down the Curtain, Opening the Gates” by 
Ahponen & Jukarainen (2000) focuses on the changing functions of the border, and “On the Border of the European Union” 
by Kirkinen & Westman (1996) brings together a dozen of articles by writers from both sides of the border. 
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Boggs 1940; Giersch 1949/1950), who described borders as artificial obstacles for trade. In his 
opinion, state borders truncate regular market networks, resulting in economic losses (Figure 2). 
“Tariffs are like rivers”, he argued, “which separate their banks economically more than would 
correspond to their actual width” (Ibid, 200).  
 
Van Houtum (1999a), then, has made a distinction 
between “different kinds of distances as proxies for the 
different aspects and impacts of borders” based on 
different regional economic approaches7. A border, van 
Houtum (1999a, 9–19; cf. O’Dowd 2003) argues, may 
increase the euclidean, travel or transport, communication, 
time, economic, administrative, social, cultural, affective, 
cognitive, and/or mental distance. 
 
Borders need not be associated as inherently disadvantaged; they have the potential to catalyze 
innovation. Borderlands tend to have distinct features and unique characteristics due to either increased 
interaction or lack thereof. Merkx (2000) has pointed out that this interaction might give rise to new 
complex identities along with creating stronger regional attachments. On the other hand, Wilson and 
Donnan (1998) have introduced the concept of ‘border anthropology’, whereby they focus attention on 
the unique identity of those burdened by strict borders. They argue that the border limits movement 
and, consequently, fruitful communication.  
3.2.2 Open versus Closed Borders  
“The whole issue of borders”, van Houtum (1998, 15) has stated, “would not be so challenging and 
interesting a subject if man would not want them to be changed”. Borders are subject to continuous 
change not only in space, but also through time. Categorizing borders as either ‘open’ or ‘closed’ paints 
a rather black and white picture. The reality is grayer, as a border may be permeable at one point in 
time and impermeable at another or may be permeable for some functions and impermeable for other 
functions. Furthermore, a distinction between ‘openness’ and ‘permeability’ has to be made (Langer 
1999, 32–33). Openness refers to “the level of expenses needed to cross the border at official border 
                                                 
7
 According to van Houtum (1999a, 1-8) these are: the flow oriented, (cross-) border region oriented, and anthropocentric 
approaches. 
Figure 2. Border as a limiting factor. 
Adapted from: Giersch (1949/1950) 
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crossings”, whereas permeability “designates the ability of a border to prevent illegal crossings, inside 
and outside the check points” (Ibid.). Hence, a closed border may be permeable and vice versa.  
 
Van Houtum (1998, 18) has translated the open border situation into human activities, where it refers to 
“a centrifugal orientation of the actors contained with the border”. He emphasizes that, in a situation 
where borders cease to limit the space for action, free movement is prevalent (cf. Leimgruber 1991; 
Ratti 1993a). Such an open border no longer functions as a barrier, but rather as a bridge connecting 
two sides of a border together, creating a meeting place for actors from various levels. In a closed 
border situation, where borders present an insurmountable barrier, the centripetal effect of the border is 
more prominent, i.e. people inhabit a closed territory and activities are oriented towards the interior 
(van Houtum 1998, 17I).   
 
The effect of the border, shown in Figure 3, is the same whether it is examined from a purely economic 
or a more general perspective. A closed border functions as a dividing line separating the two sides of 
the border from each other. This forces not only companies, but also people in general to orient 
themselves towards the interior of the country, limiting simultaneously the potential market area of 
firms or, in general, potential space for action for the people inhabiting areas close to the border. 
Limited market area means weaker competitiveness in relation to other otherwise comparative centers 
(cf. Rietveld 1993; 2001). All this, together with location as an edge of a community, makes border 
regions what is often referred to as ‘peripheral’ (see e.g. Eskelinen & Snickars 1995). The EU, then, is, 
perhaps, the most well known example of what is considered to be an open border situation. In this case 
national governments have decided to relax (at least certain functions of) their national borders. This 
decision encourages cross-border economic activities, which in turn aims to deliver economic growth 
for the states in question and for the Union as a whole.  
 
Rietveld (2001) has remarked that the consequences of the opening of a border may be twofold. If the 
barrier effect becomes lower or disappears, a border region may develop from national level periphery 
towards an international centre, when enterprises in the close proximity to the border benefit from their 
new window-position. This creates new possibilities, for example by the means of new contacts and 
expanding market area, but on the other hand also competition is likely to intensify when the 
enterprises across the border are able to capture the same markets.  
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Figure 3. Influence of the opening of a border on the increase of cross-border contacts. Adapted from: Heigl (1978) 
and Janssen (2000). 
 
Even though the gradual opening of borders creates new opportunities for interaction and enables the 
formation of new relevant space for action, the border – especially the EU external border – itself is 
likely remain a filter for a diverse set of flows between different jurisdictions (Ratti 1993a; Alanen & 
Eskelinen 2000; van Houtum 2000b; Scott 2000; 2002). This, then, will hinder further integration.  
 
Since the degree of border openness relates to its relative effect as a barrier, these developments have 
their influence on the grand battle between fragmenting and cohesive forces in the border regions (see 
Krugman 1991). In general, borders tend to prevent freedom of movement (cf. Jones 1943) and cause 
extra expenses for the economic flows aiming to cross it (Alanen & Eskelinen 1995). All this makes it 
interesting to ponder why then, as van Houtum (1998, 18) has asked, are all borders not open? Why, 
then, do we have borders at all? 
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3.2.3 The Raison d’être of Borders 
As van Houtum (1998, 21) has suggested, the simplest way to understand the significance of the 
existence of borders is to examine them by their function – borders serve a purpose. All areas, regions, 
and territories have some kind of borders distinguishing them from other corresponding units; borders 
mark out an area, of which certain activity or an order is typical and characteristic. Still, as Jukarainen 
(2003, 17) has noticed, their nature is twofold. On the one hand, borders are necessary and useful, but 
on the other, they are troublesome. Even though borders limit our lives they also have an effect on how 
we behave in different circumstances, how we perceive different places (Hallikainen 2003, 18) and 
they also help us to create and perceive differences, which are indispensable for us in order to construct 
contexts and meanings (Hall 1999, 152) and to make sense in otherwise such a complex society where 
we live in (see Lehtonen 1996; Paasi 1999a). Such an understanding clearly rejects the suggestion, 
endorsed for example by Giddens (1985, 50), that a border is nothing but “a known and geographically 
drawn line separating and joining two or more states” [emphasis added]. 
 
A more comprehensive answer must however be sought in the aspect of social cohesion associated with 
territoriality. Humans as ‘territorial animals’ have an inherent tendency to form social groups8 (Ardrey 
1966). Spatial borders are the result of the differentiation of groups in space; they separate ‘us’ from 
‘them’. Human actions (or those of groups) are irreversible in space as well as in time; these actions are 
manifested in a place in space (van Houtum 1998, 18). Accordingly, borders, as human constructions, 
are identifying marks in space; they are expressions of sovereignty, of power and independence. 
Borders express the controlling of space and, as a consequence, they have at least military, juridical, 
welfare, fiscal, and ideological functions (Guichonnet & Raffestin 1974). Most of these functions are 
institutional characteristics and may, thus, be refuted by a single political decision – if desired. Borders 
have, however, also functions that cannot be refuted as rapidly. Westlund (1999) has remarked that 
technical-logistical and political-administrative borders are much less resistant to change than cultural-
historical, geographical, and biological borders (Table 1). 
 
                                                 
8
 In his widely popularized book, Ardrey (1966) argued that only a minority of species maintain territories with well defined 
boundaries, within which they live and find all the resources they need. 
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Table 1.  Factors generating interaction costs, grouped by potential for 
change (Westlund 1999, 107). 
The formation of borders is a continuous process, in which they evolve overtime into stable 
institutional manifestations of not 
only power, but also of socio-spatial 
consciousness in social practices and 
discourses: in politics, 
administration, economics, culture, 
or the organization of ethnic 
relations (Paasi 1996). In some 
cases, the border is rooted so 
profoundly into the minds of the 
people that it may never lose its 
relevance even if the actual 
institutional border would eventually 
subside.  
 
3.3 Border Regions and Cross-Border Cooperation 
The cross-border co-operation approach, then, has gained more importance since the early 1990s. It 
takes a more political approach to the topic; the barrier effect of the border may be lowered by 
encouraging border regions to co-operate with their neighboring regions (van Geenhuizen & Ratti 
2001; Ratti 1993a/b). It is commonly expected that with the help of multileveled governance, these 
peripheral regions may be turned into places for action (see e.g Eskelinen & Snikkars 1995; Eskelinen 
2000, 2001; Eskelinen & Zimine 2003, 2004; cf. Scott 2000; Cronberg 2003). 
 
One of the most visible forms of this has been the emergence of institutional cross-border regions all 
around Europe. These ‘Euroregions’ or ‘Euregions’ may be seen as an example of the increasing 
influence of the EU (Perkmann 2003, 153) and a new governance structure, in which the role of 
regional governance is strengthened at the expense of the nation-state. This is exactly what Cronberg 
(2003, 235–236) has referred to as “post-modern challenge to a nation-state”. Albeit perhaps the most 
visible, this is only one of the indications that the subsidizing role of the EU has become ever stronger 
since the 1980s (cf. Eskelinen 2000, 143–148). The main purpose of the EU funding for border regions 
has been to raise the level of development of a region in par with that of the other regions in the 
country in question. To some low-density areas, the EU programmes have become a major opportunity 
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for further development. Recently, the focus has shifted towards the newest EU member states, where 
the level of development falls behind older member states, as well as towards the external EU border, 
particularly with Russia, where in contrast to building cohesion and blurring divides, the issue concerns 
the “ambiguity between co-operation and control” (Cronberg (2003, 223). 
 
In addition to numerous individual articles and other publications, the increasing number of volumes 
and article compilations by today’s top researchers, specifically focused on the topic, illustrates how 
important role the CBC studies play in the especially within the social sciences (see e.g. Cappelin & 
Batey 1993; van der Velde & van Houtum 2000; Hedegaard & Lindström 2002). As an applicable 
example for my purposes, Eskelinen’s (2000) article delved into the co-operation across the Finnish-
Russia border and concluded that the experiences thus far illustrate that “the partial opening of the 
formerly closed border is not sufficient to transform the dynamics of regional development” and that 
there are major “difficulties encountered in searching for an institutional regime for cooperation across 
the line of exclusion” (Ibid, 148) – an interesting contrast to several other writings, which have 
glorified the recent developments in the field (see e.g. Cronberg 2000; 2003; Shlyamin 2003; 2004).  
3.3.1 Borderland/region as a Periphery 
Border regions may be considered peripheral for a number of reasons (Urwin & Rokkan 1983; van 
Houtum 1998, 20). In addition to – what is often considered to be – their disadvantageous geographical 
location, border regions lag behind in their position in relation to a territorial centre. The centre wishes 
to secure itself against undesired influences from the outside – and such a securing occurs mainly at the 
border. Consequently, the borderland may transform into a vacuum where no central power reaches, 
but where political dividing lines restrict interaction (Merkx 2000). Thus, the centre-periphery 
relationship reigns in economic matters and is recognizable in the often-unbalanced division of wealth 
between the centre and the periphery of a country (Hansen 1976, 1983; van Houtum 1998, 20).  
 
Culturally, border regions are often considered as peripheral not only by its inhabitants, but by its 
foreign neighbors as well (van Houtum 1998, 20). Border areas are zones, where influences from both 
sides of the border overlap and are filtered. In some cases, national feelings of identity and loyalty for 
one of the countries are not always manifested a priori (Augelli 1980). Needless to say, the transborder 
influence is relational to the openness of the border. In addition, the influence of border regions on 
national politics and policies is most often limited (van Houtum 1998, 20). Consequently, their role in 
national decision making processes has been closer to that of an object rather than that of a subject. 
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This, then, has led some border regions to seek better opportunities from the other side of the border. 
Especially in countries with more protectivist national policies, this is usually done with the help of 
regional alliances or external stimuli, such as the EU.  
 
Border regions are unquestionably peripheral, but that peripherality is not necessarily a disadvantage. 
Eskelinen and Snickars (1995) have argued that peripheral borderlands have the potential to become 
competitive fields of interaction; border regions that consider themselves as lagging behind should seek 
for new opportunities from border regions on the other side, which most likely face the same problems. 
The problem here is that in the case of a closed border such interaction is difficult – if not impossible – 
to establish.  
 
In today’s world, where state subsidies for ‘less-favored’ regions are in decline, peripheral regions are 
forced to fight harder and harder for attracting investments, employment, and eventually people 
(Käkönen 1999, 379). In several cases, the centre-oriented production of services and organization of 
activities have transformed border regions into resource restricted backwoods, which have been more 
dependent on national, rather than transborder connections (Urwin & Rokkan 1983). On the other hand, 
in a global world, where distances are easier to overcome, peripheral location in the vicinity of 
international border may be turned into an advantage for example with the help of cheaper production 
costs or the creation of brand new transborder contacts. Jukarainen (2003, 10) has emphasized that the 
‘backwardness’ or ‘borderlandness’9 may also be affirmative. In addition, the isolation of border 
regions may have enabled the preservation of particular differentials, which have been lost elsewhere.  
3.3.2 Aims, Motives, and Benefits 
Different actors have different motives and aims when it comes to CBC. The official principal aim of 
the CBC, put forward by the Commission, is to remove border barriers, restrictions and other factors, 
which contribute to the separation of border communities. This is done with the help of three 
principles, initially introduced by the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) and later 
followed by the European Commission (see 2000, 11–14). These include: 1) wide-ranging vertical and 
horizontal partnership; 2) subsidiarity, through involving the regional and local levels and delegating 
responsibility to them; and 3) preparation of joint cross-border development concepts and programmes, 
implementation of cross-border projects. 
 
                                                 
9
 Jukarainen (2003, 10) uses the Finnish language terms ‘syrjäseutuisuus’ and ‘rajaseutuisuus’.  
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As Anderson and Bort (2001, 63) have pointed out, the motives of CBC have remained fairly constant 
over the last decades. The fundamental motive focuses on resolving the practical difficulties created by 
the border; i.e. on lowering the barrier effect, on developing good neighborly relations, and on gaining 
information about the neighboring regions. More than anything else, CBC represents an important 
policy tool in the European integration process10. Russia, in particular, is an important partner, with 
which the EU has considerable interest to engage and build a strategic partnership. Russia is not only 
the EU’s largest neighbor, brought even closer to the EU by enlargement, but also a major energy 
supplier, a large market for EU goods and services, and a key ally in EU efforts to combat against 
common threats. (European Commission 2005.) Thus, it is only logical that the EU’s main objective is 
to engage with Russia to build a genuine strategic partnership, founded on common interests and shared 
values. In addition, however, there are more practical motives, such as infrastructure planning, the 
development of transport facilities, and collaboration of services (Halonen 2005, 12) that may well be 
perceived to be the most beneficial for the local level.   
 
According to Blatter and Clement (2000a, 87), there are two specific and functional motives for cross-
border co-operation. Firstly, interdependencies and spillover effects that reach across borders and must 
be jointly addressed in order to take advantage of possible synergies and/or avoid negative externalities 
inherently link border regions. Secondly, intrastate tensions and cleavages between the border region 
(periphery) and the capital (political centre) in each country motivate regional actors to look to their 
neighbors as allies. The former aspect underlines the functional interdependencies between the regions 
on both sides of the border. It stresses the rationality of co-operation between institutions in order to 
avoid problems or developments that would affect both regions in a negative way and to advance 
regional development. Effective CBC may supply border regions with merits in terms of social and 
economic development improved infrastructure and/or environmental protection.  
 
According to Kempe et al. (1999) effective CBC can contribute to overcoming legacies of the past and 
negative images. This is very much applicable to Finnish-Russian relations, which have often been 
marred by distrust and suspicion. Daily co-operative interaction may contribute to the establishment of 
fruitful and trustful partnerships. In addition, normative models, mainly propagated by the European 
                                                 
10
 The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was first outlined in a Commission Communication on Wider Europe in 
2003, followed by a more developed Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy published in 2004. This 
document sets out in concrete terms how the EU proposes to work more closely with its neighboring countries (see 
European Commission 2003; 2004).  
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Union, stress the importance and success of structural funds and programmes in raising 
competitiveness and territorial cohesion in the European Union (Ibid.). 
3.3.2 Preconditions for and Obstacles to Effective Co-operation 
CBC cannot be based on mere goodwill (Cappelin 1993a; Brenner 1993; Anderson 2000; Anderson & 
Bort 2001). In this respect, Cappelin (1992, 13–15; 1993a, 71–74) has argued that, along with 
functioning transportation linkages, common values, history, local ‘industrial atmosphere’, 
administrative regulations, public institutions, and sociopolitical identity are the principal preconditions 
for the establishment of effective CBC.  
 
In comparison, Anderson (2000, 211) has underlined that the most important requirement for co-
operation is the general awareness of a common problem or problems, which would function as an 
impetus for co-operative initiatives. Other essential prerequisites are the number of activists who are 
committed to the cause in key positions with powerful political patronage as well as the mutual 
comprehension and understanding between the actors (Ibid.). Through the history of CBC, participants 
have intended to establish networks of like-minded people who can support initiatives and help to 
respond to the unforeseen situations that arise in frontier regions (Halonen 2005, 17). It has to be borne 
in mind that to be effective any given form of co-operation has to be built not only on common 
knowledge and understanding, but fundamentally also on mutual trust. 
 
Anderson (2000) has also discovered that if the co-operation is to be maintained at an effective level, 
three main rules of good behaviour must be followed. Firstly, stereotyping the characteristics and 
behaviour of the other nationality or nationalities involved in co-operation should be avoided. 
Secondly, CBC should be project-based in order to avoid endless, usually fruitless, debate of which 
principles should frame co-operation. Thirdly, Anderson argues that cross-border associations should 
be able to finance their own activities. 
 
Even if motivating at times, structural asymmetries between different administrative systems can, 
according to Blatter & Clement (2000a, 91), be also a major obstacle to CBC. The asymmetry is 
manifested by differences in competences, central-local relations, budgetary cycles, administration 
hierarchies, the roles of elected officers and public servants (Anderson 2000, 209), and by the varying 
extent of central government involvement in CBC (Ibid, 66).  
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Cappelin (1993b, 13) has discovered that there exist several obstacles to interregional co-operation. 
Among the most common of these are: 1) different institutional competences, a development level, or 
languages; 2) inadequate financial resources, specification of respective interests, identification of 
respective weaknesses and strengths, development of networking process between regional actors, and 
design of those efficient institutional forms, which are required for managing the co-operation scheme; 
3) lack of engagement, motivation, knowledge, and reciprocal trust; and finally 4) insufficient stability 
in objectives and of the persons responsible for the individual projects as well as the length of time 
required for preparing joint activities. It has to be borne in mind that these differences matter more to 
some people than to others (Halonen 2005, 16). They may cease to matter when both sides realize that 
their systems are different and each side is responsible for pursuing their jointly agreed objectives with 
their own authorities (Ibid). Hence, the aim does not always have to be to eliminate the differences, but 
simply to recognize and to be aware of them.  
3.3.3 Regional Co-operation 
Van der Schelde and Hœkveld (1992) have developed an excellent model of regional systems that 
function in an international context as well a within a cross-border interaction of borderlands. They 
argue that regional systems should not be seen as massive quantities, but as multilayered structures in 
which every layer has its own scale and is part of a more extensive layer. Each layer is primarily 
dependent on the areal division of labor. Van der Schelde and Hœkveld (1992) note that there is a layer 
of a regional system that is based on resources exploited on behalf of national or international markets, 
while integrated into daily local interactions. At all levels, these regional systems may cross the border, 
thereby generating cross-border interactions.  
 
Martinez (1994) believes that the intensity of CBI correlates with the level of interdependency of the 
two sides. In this respect, he has categorized borderlands according to the intensity of interaction. In 
‘alienated borderlands’, located along functionally closed borders, residents of each country interact as 
strangers and tension prevails. In ‘co-existent borderlands’, the border remains slightly open, stability 
fluctuates, and residents from different sides consider each other as causal acquaintances. 
‘Interdependent borderlands’ are more stable and, hence, economic and social co-operation between 
neighbors is more vibrant, which, in turn, leads to the expansion of borderlands themselves. Finally, in 
‘integrated borderlands’ the stability is strong and permanent, the sides are functionally merged and the 
movement of people and goods is unrestricted. (Martinez 1994.) 
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3.4 People and the Construction of Borders 
Instead of evaluating borders by concepts such as ‘market’, ‘flow’ or ‘locational (dis)advantages’, the 
constructivist approach relies on terms such as ‘identity’, ‘social construction’, ‘attitude’, ‘feelings of 
belonging’, or ‘us versus them’ (van Houtum 2000a, 8) to better understand how people mentally 
construct borders according to their own experiences and knowledge and how the consequently 
reproduced border is perceived, which areas are regarded as wholesome regions or entities, and 
according to which criteria these regions diverge from its neighboring regions. In trying to determine 
the actions and behavior of people at and within the national borders, the borders themselves are no 
longer seen merely as territorial lines at a certain place in space, but as symbols of processes of social 
binding and exclusion that are both constructed or produced in society as well as reproduced via 
perceptions, symbols, norms, belief, and attitudes (van Houtum 2000a, 7).  
 
This in mind, it would be appealing reinstate also such terms as ‘behavior space’, ‘loss-of-strength 
gradient’ and ‘critical boundary’, introduced by Boulding (1962) as early as half a century ago, to 
challenge the simple but profound concern of geographers that humans interact most with those to 
whom they are closest – the axiom being that the way in which a border is perceived affects the volume 
of interaction across the border.  
3.4.1 The Changing Role of Borders 
Borders are doubtlessly in flux, but they are not likely to disappear, as some authors have been more 
than eager to announce (see Reich 1991; Ohmae 1995; 1999). Other authors (see e.g. Anderson 1995; 
Hirst & Thompson 1996; Paasi 1996; 2005; Newman 1999) have called for more analytical approaches 
to scrutinize the changing role of not only borders, but also the state, power, and sovereignty in a 
globalizing world. 
 
Traditional definitions and comprehension of borders have been challenged, because the context in 
which they have existed has also altered. The world, where borders were understood merely as 
concrete, empirical manifestations of state sovereignty, no longer exists. Whereas the nation-state has 
been losing some of its importance, sub- and transnational regions have elevated their profile – unlikely 
just a minor passage taking into consideration that a specific committee has been established for the 
purpose11.     
                                                 
11
 The EU Committee of the Regions was set up by Maastricht Treaty in 1992.  
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As Anderson and O’Dowd (1999, 594) have discovered, every state border, and every border region, is 
unique. Deriving from that, the Mitranian functionalistic theory of interstate co-operation would seem 
like solid good sense, but on closer examination it becomes controversial and open to interpretation. 
The necessity of common solutions to comprehensive problems may, in short terms, well be organized 
according to the basic principle of “form follows function” (Mitrany 1943, 236), but it does not mean 
that the structural properties of the larger system, which dictate the depth and range of the regional 
arrangements, could be neglected. “Local particularities, whether political, economic, social or cultural, 
can only be understood in terms of wider conceptualizations” (Anderson & O’Dowd 1999, 594). Thus 
also the theoretical and historical contextualization of borders and border regions in general is required 
to fully understand the contemporary circumstances at the border in question. 
3.4.2 The Dichotomies 
In relation to the construction of borders, two vital distinctions can be made: firstly, between functional 
and affective borders (van Houtum 1998; cf. Leimgruber 1991; Paasi 1996) and, secondly, between 
concrete and abstract borders (van Houtum 1998; cf. Koffka 1935). Functional borders are indicators of 
the limits of an organization’s jurisdiction, while the term ‘affective borders’ refers to the emotional tie 
people have with a certain territory. Van Houtum (1998, 23) underlines that it is crucial to understand 
that human activities in space do not only make up places, but may also be affectively guided, and even 
obstructed by borders.  
 
“It is clear that the emotional meaning of one country’s borders, unconsciously, is fused with that of 
one’s own boundaries” (Falk 1983). Similarly, van Houtum (1998, 24) points out, deriving from Ratzel 
(1897) and Prescott (1987), that a people’s self-image (space conception) and their pride are important 
factors in the demarcation, opening up and closing of borders. According to this view, border disputes 
might be considered a barometer for the condition of relationships between two neighboring states. 
Concrete borders, then, are visible jurisdictional borders, whereas abstract borders are cognitive 
borders, borders that have been mentally conceived by people. This distinction, employed by van 
Houtum (1998), is based on the early work of Koffka, which distinguishes between “things as they 
‘really’ are and things as they look to us” (Koffka, 1935, 35).  
 
In this respect, perception plays an important role, the starting point cognitive process. The knowledge 
and recognition of environmental stimuli is called ‘spatial cognition’, which must be regarded as the 
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subjective ‘knowing of a space’ given that it results from the interaction between appearance and 
personal perception (van Houtum 1998, 39; cf. Veitch & Arkkelin 1995) – it is socially and 
subjectively constructed.  
 
For my purposes, it is crucial to understand the role of a border as a barrier in a cognitive sense. The 
information on one side of the border reaches the other side rarely or not at all and, thus, spatial 
cognition, the frame of reference for activities in space, declines across the border (van Houtum 1998, 
39). Accordingly, Lundén (1973) has studied different kinds of spatial cognition by the inhabitants of a 
country. Taken together, he found out it to be evident that a border can cause a true division. Even 
though he discusses the situation at the border between Norway and Sweden, where the setting differs 
greatly from that at the Finnish-Russian border, I find its message valid also here, where – if anything – 
the role of the border as a separator should be even stronger. Lundén’s (1973) results show that only 
recreational activities and shopping profit from the division, whereas all other activities are obstructed 
by the border’s presence. This comes fairly close to the situation at the Finnish-Russian border, where a 
great deal of the border traffic consists of short visits for buying low-cost commodities, petrol and 
tobacco. 
 
Van Houtum (1998) has analyzed the situation further and discovered that cognitive space is 
determined mainly by personal experience-based reality, but also, especially in modern-societies, by 
knowledge-based reality. He points out, making a reference to environmental psychology, that 
experiencing and learning about the environment enable a human being to develop assumptions about 
reality and that these assumptions make it easier for an individual to act in everyday life. Because of 
more extensive information flows and increased mobility, one can also expand his or her knowledge-
based reality enormously, thereby making a positive distinction between the borders of the mind and 
territorial borders.  
 
3.5 Hypotheses 
On the basis of the foregoing discussion three hypotheses, one form each section introduced above, can 
be drawn. Firstly, notwithstanding the palpable gradual opening of the border, the Finnish-Russian 
border seems function more as barrier separating two sides from each other than a bridge linking the 
sides together. Accordingly, it is likely that the border is still far away from what has been referred to 
as an open border situation. This does not, by any means, imply that the border would be closed by all 
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of its functions; it is likely that the border is perceived to be more open to certain flows and functions 
than to others. Due to the era of closure and consequent lack of interaction, it is also expected that the 
actors from different sides of the border may perceive the actual cause of the barrier effect differently. 
In light of the fact that the border and its role occupy the central focus in this study, I have put forth the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H: 1) Despite its gradual opening, the border is still perceived as a relatively high barrier for 
interaction by both Finnish and Russian actors. 
 
Secondly, peripherality is depicted as a problem on both sides, and thus a potential focal point for CBC 
problem solving, as both side would be eager to transform their peripherality into an opportunity by 
looking for new contacts across the border. Even though most of the factors in Cappelin’s (1992, 13-
15; 1993b, 71-74) list of obstacles may easily be found in effect at the Finnish-Russian border, I 
believe that CBC has the potential to overcome these obstacles and offer solutions to lower the barrier 
effect. Despite the fact that CBC practices have developed in a noticeably more mutually governed 
(and beneficial) direction, there is the possibility that Russia - being an outsider of the EU, which is the 
main financier of such practices – may still be perceived as an outsider. This, then, may become visible 
in the findings of this study as a less positive evaluation of the impact and benefits of greater 
interaction across the border. Consequently, a following hypothesis has been drawn: 
 
H: 2) Even though Russian actors may feel more guarded about the impacts of greater 
interaction across the Finnish-Russian border, interaction is perceived to be by both sides as, 
generally speaking, mutually beneficial.  
 
Thirdly, the 70-year-long closure of the border problematized the border in peoples’ minds in the sense 
that the fundamental opening of the border does not depend totally on the actual characteristics of the 
border, but on a change of attitudes and values as well. I expect to find that the Finnish-Russian border 
is still perceived to obtain both functional and affective, and concrete and abstract characteristics. 
Given that both sides of the border have gone though a remarkable transformation process, it seems 
logical to also assume that:  
 
H: 3) The role of the Finnish-Russian border has changed from ‘great dividing line’ towards 
more fuzzier zone of interaction.  
 
Before analyzing the data and the validity of the above hypotheses, it is necessary to direct the reader’s 
attention to the main characteristics of the research area, the Finnish-Russian border and border region. 
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Figure 4. The Finnish-Russian border region. 
4 THE FINNISH-RUSSIAN BORDER AND BORDER REGION   
The effect of a border depends on the capability of people and regional systems to cross the border, 
which in turn depends on the border’s characteristics (van der Schelde & Hœkveld 1992, 483). Langer 
(1999, 40–41) has argued that when the effect of the border is being studied, a special attention has to 
be paid to its main characteristics such as its age, mode of emergence, status, permeability, and 
semantic. These characteristics, in the case of the Finnish-Russian border, will be shed light on in the 
following. 
4.1 Introduction 
Today, the territory of Finland is divided into five provinces (in Finnish: lääni), 19 regions (maakunta, 
NUTS 3), and 432 municipalities (kunta). The Russian federation, after the federal reform in 2000, 
consists of seven federal districts 
(federalnyye okruga) and 89 smaller 
subjects12. The border region, 
consisting of all regions along the 
1340-kilometer long border, is 
illustrated in Figure 4. The border is 
also an external border of the EU13 – a 
status, which is unlikely to change in 
foreseeable future. 
 
In addition to seven international 
border-crossing points there are 
several other border-crossing points 
subject to license. Currently, a vast 
majority, approximately 75 per cent 
(close to five million per year) of the 
border crossings occur at the border of 
the Leningrad region, 23 per cent at 
the border of Karelian Republic, and 
                                                 
12
 Federal subjects include republics, regions (oblasts), krais, autonomous districts (okrugs), federal cities, and an 
autonomous oblast, all of which comprise the seven federal districts (федеральные округа). 
13
 Before the latest enlargement (1.5.2004) of the EU this was the only land border between the EU and Russia. 
 41 
0
1000000
2000000
3000000
4000000
5000000
6000000
7000000
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
Year
Figure 5. Border crossings at the Finnish-Russian border 1989-2005  (Border Guard 2000; 2004; Ministry of 
Interior 2005). 
Figure 6. Border crossing at Niirala-Värtsilä 1987-2005 (Border 
Guard 2000; 2004) 
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two per cent at the border of the Murmansk Region. (Border Guard 2005). In general, the number of 
border crossings has increased significantly, especially during the mid 1990s, in 2005 totaling 
approximately 6, 5 million people (Figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 6, the Niirala-Värtsilä crossing point, the third busiest crossing at the Finnish-Russian border, 
is used as an example to illustrate the share of people crossing the border according to their nationality. 
Whereas the number of Finns has 
increased rapidly in the mid 1990s and 
stabilized after the millennium, the 
share of Russians has grown rather 
steadily, almost equaling the number of 
Finns in 2004. In 2005, the share of 
Finns crossing the border again 
increased, whereas the share of 
Russians declined14. The situation at 
the other crossings is surprisingly 
similar. 
                                                 
14
 A great deal of the border traffic consists of short visits for buying commodities. Consequently, the increased number of 
border crossing does not necessarily denote a greater number of people crossing the border, but it is likely that certain 
persons cross the border more often.    
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4.2 A Little History of the Grand Border 
The history of the border, which today separates Finland and Russia, dates back to the consolidation of 
the Swedish and Russian Empires during the early second millennium, after which the border has been 
redrawn several times according to the changing balance of power. For the purpose of this study, the 
first significant period took place in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when, in practice, there 
was no border at all and, consequently, people were free to move around. The everyday reality of the 
border fringe was the co-operation in all areas of the society. During the eighteenth century, then, the 
Russian Empire obtained the supremacy and, thus, the border was pushed further westwards. This 
resulted in the Swedish Empire finally handing over the territory of Finland to the Russian Empire in 
1809. 
 
Under Russian rule, Finland received the status of Grand Duchy, and a custom border with Russia was 
established. This border, however, was neither a military border nor an ethnic one. The nineteenth 
century witnessed the rise of an active nation-building process in Finland, which translated into the 
border being progressively defined in terms of an autonomous nation-state. Eventually, Finland gained 
its independence in connection to both WW I and the Russian revolution in 1917. The hostile military 
border between Finland and Soviet Russia was formed, which put a halt to all forms of co-operation. 
Not until the aftermath of the WW II, when two wars15 between Finland and USSR were fought, did 
the border acquire its present-day form. 
 
For everyday people, the border remained practically closed for 70 years, from Finland’s independence 
until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. During this time, the border gained several different roles and 
functions, such as historical, political, ideological, natural, and artificial (see Paasi 1996), the influence 
of which is still felt today – at least in the minds of people. In a global context, the most significant of 
these was its ideological role, as it marked a boundary between East and West, which became even 
more blatant during the Cold War. Equally important was its function as a separator of people. The 
border hindered most interaction, yet some interaction across the border did occur. On the other hand, 
the border blessed the formation of two different political and economic systems. The separating 
impact of the border explains, in part, why the regions it divides are considered today peripheral in 
many sense of the word.  
 
                                                 
15
 The so-called Winter War (1939-1940) and the Continuation War (1941-1944). 
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Up until the last years of the USSR, interaction across the Finnish-USSR border, especially at a 
regional or local level, was limited to particular projects, which were implemented within the context 
of centralized political agreements and bilateral trade (Alanen & Eskelinen 2000, 59). After the 
collapse of the USSR, interaction across the border accelerated. New international border-crossing 
points were opened and various cross-border exchanges developed among enterprises, non-
governmental organizations, and among scientific institutions. After Finland’s entry to the EU in 1995, 
CBC had to be reconceptualized in terms of European integration and EU politics. Accession brought 
with it the broader dynamics of international politics and enabled the implementation of new bilateral 
programmes within the EU frameworks. Furthermore, the border regime was adapted to the Schengen 
principles in 2001. 
 
4.3 The Rules of the Game 
The “Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance” (known as the YYA Pact) was 
the basis for Finno–Soviet relations from 1948 onwards. The agreement, later described as by President 
Yeltsin as “unfair to Finland”, gave Finnish neutrality a shade that was not easily in line with the 
accepted interpretations of international law (Sutela 2001, 6). Finally, in 1991, Finland held 
negotiations on the new “treaty on good neighbourliness and co-operation”, which was however 
rejected in the last minute by President Yeltsin. Instead, the same treaty was then signed with Russia in 
January 1992, retiring the YYA Pact and the previous special relations with Finland. Just a few weeks 
later, Finland applied for the membership of the EU. (Sutela 2001, 6–7.) 
 
The EU and the USSR had already signed an agreement on trade and co-operation in 1989. Soon after 
the agreement came the collapse of the USSR and the agreement did not have time to play any major 
role. It was then substituted with a “Partnership and Co-operation agreement” (PCA), signed in 1994, 
and which entered into force in 1997 for an initial duration of 10 years. This agreement is founded on 
shared principles and objectives and it confirms that the EU and Russia are strategic partners (European 
Commission 2005).  
 
Internally, the EU had laid down its basic approach to relations with Russia in its Common Strategy on 
Russia in 1999, which was not, however, extended beyond June 2004. Instead, the Commission 
adopted a Communication, which proposed measures to improve the effectiveness of EU-Russia 
relations, in particular in the light of increased mutual dependence, the forthcoming enlargement, and 
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unresolved conflicts in some countries bordering Russia (European Commission 2005). Likewise, 
Russia independently determined its own objectives of development of relations with the EU in its 
Middle Term Strategy towards the EU 2000-2010. Furthermore, the EU Country Strategy Paper on 
Russia was adopted by the Commission in 2001. It provides the strategic framework within which EC 
assistance will be provided for the period 2002–2006 (European Commission 2001).  
 
At the St. Petersburg Summit in 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to reinforce their co-operation and 
earlier goal of a Common European Economic Space (CEES) by defining the long term four ‘common 
spaces’. It was decided to create common economic spaces of: 1) freedom, 2) security and justice, 3) 
co-operation in the field of external security; as well as 4) research and education, including cultural 
aspects (European Commission 2005). A single package of Road Maps for the practical 
implementation of the four Common Spaces was then adopted at the Moscow Summit in 2005. The 
Road Maps build on the on-going co-operation, set out further specific objectives, and determine the 
actions necessary to make the Common Spaces a reality. The fundamental aims of the Common Spaces 
are to 1) create an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia by bringing down the 
barriers to trade; 2) promote democracy, the rule of law, respect for human right, and fundamental 
freedoms; 3) share the responsibility for an international order and promote the role of international and 
regional organizations; and 4) capitalize on the strength of research communities and cultural and 
intellectual heritage by identifying key measures to promote economic growth and competitiveness, 
reinforce links between research and innovation, and to encourage closer co-operation in the field of 
education. (European Commission 2005.) 
 
4.4 The Finnish-Russian Periphery 
The Finnish regions confronting the border with Russia are not only peripheries of Finland, but also 
those of the EU. From the geopolitical point of view, the position of these areas have been that of a 
buffer zone, where influences from outside is finally blocked, and where no important power structures 
ought to be established. National policies have made an effort to support border regions and make them 
equal with other parts of the country, but that task has proven to be unrealistic. This has encouraged 
border regions to be more proactive and innovative, a process made easier by the strengthened role of 
regional governments and the opening of the border.  
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The age of closure left a strong mark that will not cease to exist in minds of the people for a long time. 
The impermeability of the border sheltered the development of two different societies, based on 
different values and ideologies, which are unlikely to co-operate without any problems. Even though 
the proliferation of CBC practices at the Finnish-Russian border may well be deemed impressive16 – 
especially considering the fact that the border was once described as a frontline of the Hungtintonian17 
‘clash of civilizations’.  
 
Borders are human creations and, thus, maybe removed also by humans. However, the exclusive rights 
linked to the nation-state status together with the inner belief of external threat makes it difficult for the 
controlling powers to relax its borders, the marks in space that delimit its territory (van Houtum 1998). 
Indeed, borders have functioned through the history as limiting factors for interaction and flows. People 
inhabiting the areas cut off by a border have had face fiscal, institutional, cultural as well as lingual 
discrepancies. In addition, border regions have been regarded as troublesome or even backward areas, 
in which the will to invest has traditionally been minimal. Border regions between states, ethnic groups, 
or cultural regions have often been places, where conflicts have been more likely to occur. As a 
consequence, such border regions have not attracted development or investment at similar rates as other 
parts of the country, in which case the infrastructure of these regions have lagged behind even more – 
hindering simultaneously other potential development in the region. Jukarainen (2003, 13) has 
remarked that Mann’s (1983) concept of ‘infrastructural power’18 describes outstandingly the particular 
situation at the Finnish-Russian border. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 For instance, in 2004, Euregio Karelia Neighbourhood programme was awarded a special certificate for outstanding 
achievements in the field of CBC at the external border to Russia. 
17
 Huntington’s civilizational thesis offers an example of adopting culture as explanatory variable for great divisions among 
humankind and the dominating source of international conflicts. See Huntington (1993/1996).  
18
 According to Mann (1983) states possess two forms of power: despotic and infrastructural. Infrastructural power is power 
gained through state interactions with society - power through society, not over society. Whereas despotic power over a 
people is maintained with a powerful and active military, infrastructural power is maintained through intertwining the state 
with society, and vice versa. 
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5 METHODS AND RESEARCH MATERIAL 
5.1 Background Information 
The data used in this study derives from the EXLINEA19 research project, which is supported by the 
European Commission Fifth Framework Programme on research and technological development. 
Assuming that the development of CBI mechanisms is a vital element in dealing with the political and 
socio-economic challenges of the EU expansion, EXLINEA research project (2003-2006) examines 
opportunities and constraints to local/regional CBC/CBI in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in 
anticipation of EU expansion. The core focus of the research is to study CBI processes and patterns as a 
result of policies at various levels and established forms of co-operation practices, conditioned by the 
perceptions of various public and private actors. (EXLINEA 2005.) Accordingly, the specific research 
goal of the supranational level studies has been defined as: “to characterize the supranational contexts 
conditioning cross-border co-operation patterns and processes in the case study regions” (EXLINEA 
2001). This entails uncovering the geopolitical significance of the case study areas in terms of EU 
discourse and specific policies and strategies affecting the respective regions including the mechanisms 
put in place to manage EU programmes (Kramsch et al. 2004, 1). The goal has been tackled by 
employing a multilevel analytical framework that allows for the scrutiny of policies, practices and 
perceptions as they affect the ability and propensity of local-level actors to engage in CBC. (EXLINEA 
2005.) 
 
On the whole, the EXLINEA research project is coordinated by Dr. James W. Scott from the Free 
University of Berlin, Germany, and the Karelian Institute in Joensuu, Finland, is one of the eight 
participant research institutes20. Here, the research, led by Dr. Ilkka Liikanen, has been carried out 
through a case study at the Finnish-Russian border. The project has included a standardized 
questionnaire and in-depth interviews, as well as an optional newspaper screening of regional and 
national level newspapers. This study examines only the questionnaire data.  
 
                                                 
19
 Lines of Exclusion as Arenas for Co-operation: Reconfiguring the External Boundaries of Europe. Policies, Practices and 
Perceptions, see Http://www.exlinea.org. 
20
 The other participants are: the Peipsi Center for Transboundary Cooperation (Estonia), the Nijmegen Centre for Border 
Research (The Netherlands), the University of Tartu, Department of Political Science (Estonia), the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, Center for Regional Studies (Hungary), the University of Thessaly, Department of Planning and Regional 
Development (Greece), and the European Institute for Regional and Local Development, University of Warsaw (Poland). 
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The questionnaire (see Appendix 1) focuses on the evolution, problems, policies, practices and 
perceptions prevailing in the old and new external borders of the EU. In total, it consists of seven 
sections: 1) Types and levels of economic interaction, 2) Immigration and social Interaction, 3) 
Identifying barriers to CBI and CBC, 4) Perceptions and images of the others, 5) Evaluation of policies 
of CBC, 6) Expected effects of greater CBI/CBC, and 7) Expected effects of EU enlargement on the 
region. For the Finnish-Russian case study, the questionnaire was translated in Finnish and Russian. 
Even though the questions were modified during the translation process to suit regionally specific 
circumstances, the questions remained identical with the original questions in order to maintain 
comparable results with case studies from other research locations21. The collection of the data was 
carried out in 2003 and 2004 by researchers Juha Ruusuvuori and Juha Kotilainen on the Finnish side 
and by Dr. Dmitry Zimin and his associates on the Russian side of the border.  
 
5.2 The Respondents 
All the respondents were chosen from an extensive array of organizations that were, one way or 
another, involved in CBC practices across the Finnish-Russian border. An attempt was made to find 
eligible actors representing private and public sectors22 as well as non-governmental organizations 
comprehensively from several different fields of CBC. From the selected organizations the persons 
who were, because of their positions, expected to have a wide understanding and knowledge 
concerning the international and CBC practices of the organization in question, were then selected as 
respondents and contacted directly. Altogether, a total of 81 people, 39 from Finland and 42 from 
Russia, was finally chosen. The respondents can be grouped as:    
 
1.Actors directly involved in managing the activities of cross-border organizations 
2.Representatives of the major city government within the respective region 
3.Representatives of regional and local industrial and commercial associations 
4.Businesses and other economic actors 
5.Representative of Non-Governmental Organizations and international organizations (e.g. UNDP) 
6.Representatives of state agencies involved in regional cross-border issues 
7.Representatives of the EU and EU-affiliated agencies, 
8.External experts and knowledgeable observers 
 
                                                 
21
 In addition to the Finnish-Russian border region, the research has been carried out in the Estonian-Russian, the Polish-
Ukrainian, the Hungarian-Ukrainian-Romanian, the Moldavian-Romanian, the German-Polish, the Austrian-Hungarian as 
well as at Greece’s borders with Albania, FYROM and Bulgaria, and in Cyprus.  
22
 A majority of respondents were representatives of the public sector. This does not, however, necessarily correspond to the 
actual share of the public sector in practice in the field of CBC. 
 48 
Due to their position and experience with cross-border issues, the chosen respondents may be regarded 
as professionals on their field. The following table summarizes the main characteristics of the 
respondents (see Appendix 2): 
Table 2. The main characteristics of the respondents. 
  FIN RUS TOTAL/ AVERAGE 
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS 39 42 81 
MALES 28 24 52 
FEMALES 11 18 29 
AVERAGE AGE 48 40 44 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE 87% 90% 89% 
PROFICIENCY OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRY 49% 29% 39% 
PROFICIENCY OF ENGLISH 74% 60% 67% 
VISITED NEIGHBORING COUNTRY OFTEN OR VERY OFTEN 92% 71% 82% 
 
It is important to remember that the chosen group of respondents consists of people from a 
geographically specific area who are involved in a specific activity, namely the cross-border co-
operation. In addition, as Matzeit and Scott (2005, 37) have pointed out, the number of people who are 
active in CBI or CBI is rather small, especially on the Finnish side of the border, and, hence, it is highly 
likely that the actors know each other quite well. Being an exclusive group of people, conclusions 
based on their opinions do not necessarily correspond with the official opinions and with the opinions 
of the ordinary people. That is to say that the results of the present study cannot be generalized to apply 
to every Finn or Russian. 
 
5.3 Experts as Respondents 
People are among the most important resources for human geographers. Some of them can be classified 
as ‘experts’ in the sense that they are in the position to offer authoritative informed views of specialized 
fields. (Lindsay 1997, 35.) Even though expert opinions are most often regarded as clear, consistent, 
and accurate, they are not always free of personal values and attitudes. A point common to all research 
involving individual responses is that we should not expect objectivity from our respondents (Ibid, 36). 
Unlike in the case of factual questions, an answer to an opinion question cannot be proven right or 
wrong; it is merely the respondent’s personal and, thus, inaccessible to independent verification. On the 
other hand, it is this rich field of personal variability that is in the core of understanding the way a 
various social phenomena operates in geographical space. 
 
 49 
Lindsay (1997, 40) has argued that the significance of experts lies usually in their position within 
organizations rather than directly in their expertise. If this is the case, it is likely that respondents will 
also strive to represent a larger group of people, rather than just speak for themselves. The biggest 
single disadvantage relying on experts, and high ranking public officials in particular, as the source of 
information is the risk of receiving ‘socially desirable’ or ‘politically correct’ answers. This study 
attempts to minimize this by using the data anonymously and focusing on the mean values of the 
sample population. 
 
5.4 Type of Data and Method of the Analysis 
Given the fairly descriptive nature of this study, a questionnaire research, despite its weaknesses, was 
the ideal method for the data collection. Being that the goal of the questionnaire was to measure 
perceptions, attitudes, and opinions, a seven-point Likert scaled multiple-item batteries was utilized in 
the case of each of the 16 question groups consisting of 169 separate items. Each item of a battery 
makes a statement about the same construct and may also be seen to obtain a similar psychological 
‘weight’ in the respondent's mind. Strictly speaking, such a scaling produces ordinal variables. 
However, as it has been argued, such data may also be treated as interval/ratio variables because of the 
relatively large number of used categories (Bryman 2004, 226; see also Bryman & Cramer 2001). Due 
to the practically interval 1-to-7 response scale, the latter option was used in the analysis of the data for 
the present study. 
 
Interval variables allow us not only to rank order the items that are measured, but also to quantify and 
compare the sizes of differences between them. Consequently, the calculated mean values of each 
individual item can be interpreted as differentiating between shades of opinion between two extremes. 
A seven-point scale gives the respondent a relatively wide range of the response options. Given that the 
present study deals with presumably knowledgeable experts, such a wide scale produces more accurate 
information of the flavors of meaning in the questions. 
 
Descriptive analyses including mean and standard deviation were used to describe both the Finnish and 
the Russian respondents’ responses to the given questions. T-test analyses were, then, used to indicate 
whether significant differences existed in the responses of the two independent samples. A normality 
test was performed in the case of each question in order to find out whether the requirements and 
assumptions of the t-test were fulfilled. The equality of variances assumption was then verified with the 
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Levene’s test. If the conditions were not met, the evaluation of differences in means between the two 
nationality groups was further examined by using nonparametric alternatives to the t-test (the Mann-
Whitney U test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test), which do not rely merely on the 
estimation of parameters (i.e. the mean or the standard deviation) as such in describing the distribution 
of the given variable in the sample population. The significance level (p-value) reported with the t-test 
results represents the probability of error involved in accepting the research hypothesis about the 
existence of a difference.  
 
In this respect the distinction between a difference and a ‘statistically significant difference’ has to be 
addressed. The standard level of significance used to justify a claim of a statistically significant effect 
in this study, as in social sciences in general, is 0.05. Accordingly, the term statistically significant is 
used with p ≤ 0.05. However, in cases where the differences between the groups are small and the 
standard deviations within the groups are relatively large the finding of ‘no statistically significant 
differences’ is likely to loose its validity. It is essential to remember that the main interest of the present 
study is in the actual values given to each sub-variable and their relation to other sub-variables; i.e. the 
ranking of items in each question battery. It is expected that differences between the Finnish and the 
Russian respondents’ responses will occur in most of the cases. Even though an attempt was made not 
to go too deeply into statistics, statistical testing was used of to find out where the differences are the 
most obvious.  
 
Moreover, Pearson correlation analyses were conducted when applicable in order to evaluate the 
relationships between the Finnish and the Russian ranking of the sub-factors in the question batteries. A 
strong correlation does not, however, imply causation. Nevertheless, a high correlation coefficient 
value indicates that both groups ranked the sub-variables in the given question battery in a similar 
manner and, thus, there exists, in theory, a certain level of mutual understanding of the given topic 
between the nationality groups may. It is my assumption that in the fields in which the interests of the 
both sides overlap, the formulation of even closer cross-border ties would be the easiest to generate. 
Conflicts and misunderstandings, on the other hand, are most likely to occur in situations where 
interests, values, and thinking of the Finnish and Russian actors differ. 
 
I have attempted to present the data in an intuitive manner. Therefore, the charts, which I use, are 
intended to match the nature of their content. For example, the data was collected using a 1-to-7 scale; 
however, when illustrated in chart form, for bipolar data, I decided to use a scale ranging from -3 to 3. 
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This facilitates the understanding of the data, because a neutral response is now located logically 
between the two extremes at either end of the scale, and is represented by a value of zero (0). 
Furthermore, the multiple-line charts used in this study provide a straightforward comparison between 
Finnish responses on the one side and Russian responses on the other. Naturally, a higher value on the 
chart represents a higher perceived barrier. The lines, in these charts, proved helpful not for their 
conventional use as measures of slope, but in ranking the sub-variables in each question battery in 
terms of their perceived relative barrier effect. Concerning the horizontal clustered bar charts, the 
variables are measured and compared horizontally in order to facilitate the comparison their mean 
values. Where no statistically significant difference between the nationality groups was found, the sub-
variables have been organized in order according to the total mean values.  
 
There is a possibility that, when using a seven-point range on a bipolar scale where a respondent is 
unable to choose the separate ‘don’t care’ or ‘have no opinion’ option, the responses may be biased 
towards the center since the respondents may use the neutral response option as a ‘dumping ground’. 
An even numbered scale would solve the problem by forcing the respondents to take a side and 
provide, thus, perhaps more the results indicative results of the polarized opinions around the issue. In 
such a case, however, it is likely that respondents are generally more likely to agree than disagree, 
particularly in opinion and attitudinal questions. In order to avoid the acquiescence response-factor the 
use of the neutral value is necessary and, I believe, well justified.  
 
5.5 Reliability, Validity, and Limitations 
Caution must be exercised when considering the results of this study. First and foremost it cannot be 
forgotten that the sample population of this study is a distinctive group of people involved in an elite 
activity. Hence, the 39 Finnish actors and the 42 Russian actors can hardly be seen as representative of 
all the corresponding actors in Finland or Russia. Secondly, the Finnish and Russian samples came 
from specific geographic areas that, while similar and close to each other, do not aim to represent their 
respective nations as a whole. Nonetheless, I am convinced that the present study can provide 
informative results as long as we are aware of its limitations. 
 
Due to the immense size of the Russian Federation and the distinctive characteristics of the regions 
alongside the Finnish-Russian border, actors in the Russian sample have been likely to face different 
realities than their colleagues in other parts of the Federation. Likewise, the Finnish sample may not 
 52 
represent corresponding actors in other parts of the country, for example in the areas focusing on co-
operation with the other neighboring countries. Moreover, the relatively different background of the 
Finnish and Russian respondents makes the comparison of the result slightly problematic. The barrier 
effect of the border may, for instance, be perceived to be high compared with the situation at the 
internal EU border, but relatively low when compared with what it used to be when the border was 
practically closed.  
 
All research methods have their pros and cons – and questionnaire research is not an exception. Even 
though it allows a large number of identical questions to be asked in a relatively short period of time, 
the data that it provides remain somewhat shallow. On the whole, a questionnaire is subjective; it tells 
respondents’ reaction as they perceive the situation in question. Furthermore, due to the international 
nature of the EXLINEA project, the questionnaire was designed to fit a number of different situations 
in diverse locations. This makes the results easier to compare, but – despite the modifications during 
the translation process – forces the different research partners to make compromises, and perhaps 
overlook more detailed location-specific information.   
 
Using a questionnaire with closed questions in pre-given categories has evidently an influence on the 
validity of the research in the form of forced answers. Even though the questionnaire was planned by 
people with experience and expertise in the field – and, as a result, the content of questionnaire can be 
seen to reflect the most pressing issues within the field – the results could have been different if the 
respondents would have been allowed to answer in an open manner. The classification of the barrier 
effect, for example, is purely pre-given and cannot, thus, be said to reflect the actual perceptions of the 
respondents without limitations. The internal reliability has, however, been attempted to maintain by an 
ambition of consistency. The original seven-point scale was used in all calculations throughout the 
study and the same scale was illustrated in every chart in order to be able to relate respondents’ scores 
on any given indicator to their scores on the other indicators.  
 
Even though the present study is based on the quantitative data from the questionnaire, it cannot go 
unnoticed that the interviewer responsible for the data collection remained present while respondents 
completed the questionnaire. Such a method encourages respondents to reflect on the questions and 
their answers and is, thus, useful because it perhaps deepens the respondents’ answers (Matzeit & Scott 
2005, 51–52). Despite their experience and expertise, some respondents are not necessarily experts in 
every aspect of the CBC. Consequently, some respondents reportedly felt incompetent to answer 
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certain parts of the questionnaire (Ibid). That may well be why some respondents found it difficult to 
provide answers to all questions. Only a few Finnish respondents left questions blank, while this was 
more common amongst Russian respondents. 
 
Given the extent of the entire EXLINEA project, the present study focuses only a limited portion of the 
data – the last four sections of the questionnaire. Answering the entire questionnaire was reported to 
have taken respondents from 30 minutes to two hours depending on their eagerness to comment on the 
questions and discuss topics relating to the questionnaire’s themes with the proctor (Matzeit & Scott 
2005, 51). Such a long questionnaire risks exhausting respondents’ interest before completing the 
questionnaire. This loss of interest is most likely to occur towards the end of the questionnaire; i.e. the 
portion, which happens to be the focus of this study. Yet, for my purposes, getting hard, quantitative 
data about actors’ perceptions and opinions is vital in describing the barrier effect of the border and the 
way the CBC/CBI is perceived among them.  
 
As a final point, the problem of my personal involvement has to be addressed. I have to recognize that 
my own cultural loading will have an effect on the way I do research. My personal background and 
nationality have admittedly influenced this research and its findings to some extent. Nonetheless, as 
Lindsay (1997, 37) has put forward, the fact that I am exploring a subjective world of individual 
perceptions and opinions should not let me abandon any kind of rigor in my exploration of it.  
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6 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The analysis of the data is organized in two sections, each corresponding to the research question of 
this study. First section concerns the barrier effect of the border. The potential causes of the barrier 
effect is first introduced as broad categories and then analyzed by category. The second section aims to 
clarify the perceptions of greater interaction across the border. The perceived impact of greater 
interaction across the border will be assessed in six sub-chapters ranging from the today’s initial 
conditions to the EU’s impact on the situation at the Finnish-Russian border.  
 
6.1 The Finnish-Russian Border as a Barrier 
The main aim of this part of the analysis is to identify, which of the main sectors and their sub-factors, 
are perceived to function the highest and lowest barriers for interaction across the Finnish-Russian 
border. A 1-to-7 response scale was used in all the questions concerning the height of the barrier effect 
at the Finnish-Russian border. A response of one (1) denotes that the respondent did not perceive the 
given variable to function as a barrier at all and a score of seven (7) signifies that the variable in 
question is considered to function as an insurmountable barrier23. In addition, I aim to find out whether 
the overall Finnish perspective differs from that of the Russian point of view, and if differences exist, 
on which issues are these differences the most apparent.  
6.1.1 Introduction 
Since there is no statistically significant association between the nationality of the respondent and the 
perceived height of the barrier effect, in 
Figures 7 and 8 both the Finnish and 
Russian respondents have been combined 
together in order to elicit the overall height 
of the perceived barrier effect of the 
Finnish-Russian border. As Figure 7 
illustrates, the frequencies of all responses 
combined together are, by and large, 
normally distributed, i.e. the given scores 
concentrate near the intermediate values 
                                                 
23
 In keeping with the intuitive format of this study, answers here are displayed as reversely scored, as opposed to the 
original scoring of the questionnaire. 
Figure 7. The height of the perceived barrier effect. 
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    Figure 8. The perceived height of the barrier effect by sectors. 
and decreases in frequency as the distance from the middle increases. The mean value of the Finnish 
responses totaled 3.90 (SD = 0.788) and Russian responses 3.62 (SD = 0.825), indicating that, overall, 
the barrier effect of the border is perceived as intermediate.  
 
In spite of all that, the standard deviations as well as the standard errors of the Russian responses were 
in each case considerably higher than that of the Finnish responses due to a large number of extreme 
values. This higher level of variability may also be seen as a higher level of uncertainty associated with 
a numerical estimate in the case of the Russian respondents. Since a greater standard error indicates 
less reliable estimates, the calculated mean values of the Russian responses are unavoidably greater 
simplifications than it the case of the Finnish respondents. This has been acknowledged in comparing 
the mean values in statistical testing later on.   
 
In Figure 8, all six pre-given main variable sectors are ranked in order according to the calculated total 
mean values. All the sectors are perceived as low or, at most, intermediate barriers for CBC/CBI. Only 
trade conditions are perceived as slightly more than an intermediate barrier on average by both the 
Finnish and Russian respondents. General conditions and level of assistance received a mean value just 
under four (4), an intermediate barrier. Interestingly, the standard deviations of trade (1.224) and 
general conditions (1.088) are 
significantly smaller than the 
standard deviation of level of 
assistance (1.573), denoting the 
smaller dispersion of the frequency 
distribution and, hence, a greater 
difference of opinion among the 
respondents. Economic geography 
is perceived clearly as a lower 
barrier with the total mean value of 
3.53 (SD = 1.226). Even though 
differences between the group 
means are not dramatic, border crossings (M = 3.28, SD 1.243) as well as infrastructure (M = 3.18, SD 
1.394) stand out as the lowest barriers for interaction. Nevertheless, the total mean average of 3.69 
confirms the initial discovery that, in general, the border is perceived as intermediate barrier for 
interaction.    
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In Figure 9, the same sector variables are 
summarized and illustrated according to 
their perceived height as a barrier for 
interaction24. As the figure illustrates, both 
trade conditions and general conditions 
seem to be perceived by the Finns as the 
main barriers, whereas level of assistance is 
clearly perceived by the Russians as the 
main barrier. In general, the Finnish 
respondents perceive the barrier effect of 
the border to be slightly higher than 
Russians. When compared with each other 
as ascending lines, only level of assistance 
and border crossings seem to form higher 
barriers for the Russians than for the Finns. 
The clearly notable difference in level of 
assistance as a barrier results mainly from 
the considerably larger share of values 
above 4 (intermediate barrier) in the case of the Russian respondents (33, 6 per cent) compared with 
that of the Finns (7, 4 per cent).  
 
Even though it can be seen from the chart that in each main sector the Finnish perspective differs from 
that of the Russian point of view, only in the cases of infrastructure (p = 0.002), level of assistance (p = 
0.01), general conditions (p = 0.000), and to a lesser extent, economic geography (p = 0.031) the 
nationality of the respondent has a statistically significant association with the perceived height of the 
barrier effect. The large standard deviation of the Russian responses is the most probable reason why 
the statistically significant differences cannot be found in the case of the other main sectors, where 
variability within the group(s) seems to be greater than the differences between the groups.  
 
                                                 
24
 To avoid the misinterpretation of the charts, the 1-to-7 scale has been maintained throughout the analysis, even though in 
most of the cases all the variable fall between the middle range values. Using a smaller scale would at times improve the 
readability of the values in relation to each other and, thus, the chart itself, but would, on the other hand, overemphasize or 
even create differences that otherwise would go unnoticed.   
Figure 9. The comparative assessment of the height of the 
barrier effect. 
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Figure 10. Trade conditions as a barrier. 
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In the following sections, each of the six sectors is covered in more detail in order to gain more detailed 
knowledge of which sub-factors within the main sectors are actually perceived as the highest barriers 
for interaction. In all charts, the categories in the legend have been organized in a descending manner 
according to their total mean value (indicated in brackets). The possible differences between the means 
of the Finnish and Russian respondents’ responses are then illustrated in the chart itself.    
6.1.2 Trade Conditions as a Barrier 
Trade conditions, the highest perceived barrier, consists of six pre-given sub-factors (Figure 10). 
Among these six, bureaucratic procedures in imports (M = 4.58, SD = 1.508), followed by 
bureaucratic procedures exports (M = 4.57, SD = 1.417), received the highest total mean values. More 
than half of respondents perceive both the 
procedures in imports and in exports as 
high barriers for interaction. Interestingly, 
the procedures in exports are perceived as 
the highest barrier by the Finns, whereas 
from the Russian point of view the main 
barrier is the procedures in imports. This 
would mean that there exists an agreement 
that the barrier effect is higher for the 
movement of goods from Finland to 
Russia than vice versa. However, the 
differences in means are small and there is 
relatively large variability within the 
groups. Thus, such a statement becomes 
statistically impossible to attest.  
 
More importantly, as the figure shows, 
regardless of the relatively large standard 
deviations within the nationality groups, all six sub-factors are perceived to be somewhat equal barriers 
for interaction from both the Finnish and Russian point of view, the total mean difference being only 
0.50 value units. The statistical testing confirmed that there is not a statistically significant association 
between the perceived height of the barrier effect of the sub-factors within the main sector of trade 
conditions and the nationality of the respondents. Even though no significant correlation between the 
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Finnish and the Russian point of view exists, it seems safe to draw the conclusion that trade conditions 
including its sub-factors are perceived to function as a substantial element of distance between Finnish 
and Russian partners.   
6.1.3 General Conditions as a Barrier 
In all eleven sub-categories, the Finnish respondents perceive the sector of general conditions to be a 
higher barrier for interaction than the Russian respondents (Figure 11). For the Finns general 
conditions function at least as an intermediate barrier (2nd highest in order), whereas for the Russians it 
seems to be a relatively low barrier (3rd in order). The data featured in this study support findings of 
previous studies that found that, 
especially from the Finnish perspective, 
frequently changing business rules, 
corruption, and security problems25 in 
Russia are the main roadblocks in the 
formation of closer cross-border 
connections (see Matzeit & Scott 2005). 
From the Russian perspective, the very 
same factors26, despite having large 
standard deviations and lower ranking 
on average, also form the top three 
barriers. Both nationality groups agree 
that different religion (TM = 2.36, SD 
1.503), one of the main factors in the 
Huntingtonian clash of civilizations 
argument, seems not to function as a 
dividing feature. Historical events (TM 
3.13, SD 1.504), then, rank unexpectedly 
as the second lowest perceived barrier27. 
This does not by any means suggest that historical events have been forgotten or lost their importance. 
Perhaps the sensitive nature of the topic has been recognized and, thus, the whole issue pushed back to 
                                                 
25
  M = 5.56, SD = 1.021; M = 5.13, SD 1.128; and M = 4.90, SD 1.294. 
26
 Respectively: M = 4.73, SD 1.45; M = 4.40, SD = 1.878, and M = 4.17, SD 1.716. 
27
 Several other sub-factors in this sector are actually indirectly related to historical events. 
Figure 11. General conditions as a barrier. 
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avoid potential disagreement that would harm progressive relations. On the other hand, a common 
history, perceived as a low barrier, could actually function as a fruitful basis for further CBC if 
managed properly. National and perhaps even EU policies, as Matzeit (2005, 3) has already suggested, 
should exploit this nucleus and help to locate, unveil and support these sources of common past and 
present. This, she argues, could then potentially contribute to region building and the formation of 
regional, perhaps even ‘cross-border’ identities (cf. Ruusuvuori & Zimine 2005). Moreover, even if the 
historical events are not perceived as a barrier, these policies – and especially the potential subsequent 
concrete co-operation between the two sides – could gradually help to reduce the historical animosities 
and resentment that may still at times resurface and block interaction. This could be, in the Finnish-
Russian case, a goal worth aiming towards.  
 
According to the collected data, language also seems to pose a significant barrier especially for the 
Finns. Given that no less than 49 per cent of the Finnish respondents consider themselves proficient in 
Russian28, the high mean value of 4.67 (SD = 1.420) may indicate that respondents are not only 
speaking for themselves, but for a wider group of actors in the field of CBC. In this respect, it should 
not be forgotten the aim of the present study is not to elicit how the actors chosen for the study 
personally feel about the topic in question, but rather how they perceive the whole field around them. 
 
Even though the differences between the total means of the sub-factors within the sector of general 
conditions are wide (TMD = 2.78) and standard deviations are large, the nationality of the respondent 
plays a statistically significant role in the perception on all the sub-factors except for in exchange rate 
instability, inflation, and different religion. Furthermore, the correlation test confirmed that there is a 
fairly strong positive correlation (r = 0.833; p = 0.001) between the Finnish and Russian perspectives, 
which for the purpose of this study may be interpreted as indicating a fairly strong mutual 
understanding of the situation concerning the barrier effect in terms of the sector of  general conditions. 
This mutual understanding is visually depicted in Figure 11 as congruently descending lines. 
 
 
                                                 
28
 It has to borne in mind that the respondents of the present study are a highly specific group of people and, thus, the figure 
does not represents the overall share of Russian speakers in Finland. 
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6.1.4 Level of Assistance as a Barrier  
In the case of level of assistance, i.e. financial support and political will, the diffences between the 
Finnish and Russian perspectives of the height of the barrier effect were the most striking. The Russian 
respondents perceive level of assistance to be a high barrier (M = 4.83, SD = 1.684), distinctly the 
highest barrier in order, whereas for the Finnish respondents it functions only as a low barrier (M = 
3.26, SD = 1.217; 4th in order). Such a finding supports Matzeit and Scott’s (2005, 36) claim that in 
Finland level of assistance can be seen actually encouraging interaction, rather than representing a 
barrier to it at all. The high mean value of the Russian responses derives, to a certain extent, from the 
unusually large number of the extreme high values (i.e. values 6 and 7), indicating simultaneously that, 
for many, a lack of assistance seems to be a major barrier for interaction. 
 
The lack of available assistance from the 
national level is considered to hinder CBI 
more than that from regional and local 
levels. The insufficient European 
organizations’ assistance is ranked 
relatively low, but scores still the total 
mean value of 3.63 (SD = 1.59), i.e. an 
intermediate barrier. However, the total 
mean difference of 1.09 value units 
indicates that all the given sub-factors are 
considered to function fairly equally as 
intermediate barriers. 
 
Figure 12 illustrates that the Finnish 
respondents perceive level of assistance 
to be a noticeably lower barrier than the 
Russian respondents in the case of each 
sub-factor. Furthermore, the differences 
between the sub-factors are considerable smaller on the Finnish side (0.41 value units) than on the 
Russian side (1.99 value units). Accordingly, there is no statistically significant correlation between the 
Finnish and Russian perceptions. 
Figure 12. Level of assistance as a barrier. 
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The greatest difference between the nationality groups seems to concern the perception of regional 
agencies’ assistance; according to the data, the Finnish respondents are fairly content with the level of 
the available assistance, whereas the Russians respondents perceive the lack of assistance to be, at least, 
a high barrier for CBC/CBI29. As expected, the testing confirmed that there exists a statistically 
significant association between the nationality of the respondent and the perceived height of the barrier 
except in the case of insufficient European organizations assistance and insufficient local government 
assistance.         
6.1.5 Economic Geography as a Barrier 
Economic geography, perceived as an intermediate barrier from the Finnish perspective (M = 3.92, SD 
= 1.121) and a low barrier from the Russian perspective (M = 3.22, SD = 1.265), was divided into six 
sub-factors. Figure 13 illustrates the divergence in the mean values given to each factor. A total mean 
difference of 2.56 indicates that there are rather wide differences in how high barriers the sub-groups 
actually are. However, five out of six of the 
sub-variables receive fairly similar mean 
values from both the Finns and Russians, 
indicating that there seems to be mutual 
understanding (r = 853, p = 0.031) 
concerning which factors within the sector 
of economic geography operate as the main 
barriers for interaction. In this respect, both 
sides agree that limited product 
differentiation of local economy stands out 
as a main building block for the barrier as 
it was predicted given that the areas in 
question, at the both sides of the border, 
are peripheral in several respects. 
Particularly in the southern part of the 
research area it is highly likely that the 
proximity of St. Petersburg attracts CBI. In 
                                                 
29
 FIN: M = 3.13, SD =1.288; RUS: M = 5.35, SD 1.872. 
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Figure 13. Economic geography as a barrier. 
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fact, as Matzeit and Scott (2005, 35) have pointed out, the immediate border region in the Russian side, 
especially the cities of Vyborg and Svetogorsk, might actually suffer in terms the economic interaction 
from this situation. The situation is somewhat similar the other way around; in Finland, Helsinki 
functions as the main attraction, whereas the actual border region functions more as a transit zone.  
 
The most statistically significant difference (p = 0.000) was found in the low purchasing power of the 
cross-border markets, which seems to represent a high barrier for the Finns, whereas the Russians 
perceive it to be a low barrier30. Such a drastic difference underlines the economic differences between 
the two countries. Since the purchasing power of the markets in Finland are perceived to be higher than 
in Russia, it may be deduced that the Russian side would actually gain the greater financial benefits 
from the opening of the border and the subsequent access to a larger market area.  
 
Despite the large standard deviations and the relatively low mean values31, a statistically significant 
difference between the nationality groups was also found in the case of difficult geographical 
conditions in border regions (p = 0.029). A large standard deviation especially in the Russian responses 
causes the difference between the groups in the case of other sub-factors not to be significant. All in all, 
the data gives only a little support to claims that the location of the main large cities too far away from 
the border in this sparsely populated area would be one of the main obstacles to intensive interaction. 
Consequently, the immediate border region with a limited product differentiation may loose its 
potential benefits to larger cities (e.g. St. Petersburg and Helsinki), which presumably attract most of 
CBI. Similar findings have been reported form other EXLINEA case study regions. Larger cities, 
which are relatively close to borders have the tendency to perform better than smaller cities, or rural 
communities (Matzeit 2005, 2), which make up most of the Finnish-Russian border regions.  
 
It is essential to notice, as mentioned in the EXLINEA substantive interim report, that Russian border 
areas have developed more formal economic contacts with other countries than with Finland (Matzeit 
and Scott 2005, 37). For example, the main foreign partner of Svetogorsk is an American paper 
company, while for Vyborg the main partners are situated in Western Europe. For Sortavala, the cross-
border economic contacts with Finland are much more important than its contacts with other countries, 
presumably due to its location further away from the other countries, but relatively close to the Finnish-
Russian border. The level of informal economic and social contacts, then, is high in all Russia’s border 
                                                 
30
 FIN: M = 4.64, SD = 1.460; RUS: M = 2.94, SD = 1.705. 
31
 FIN: M = 2.61, SD = 1.285; RUS: M = 1.85, SD = 1.578. 
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areas (Ibid). Local citizens on the Russian side often travel to the neighboring towns in Finland; 
likewise Finnish citizens often visit Russian border areas exercising informal cross-border trade. 
6.1.6 Barriers in Crossing the Border 
Barriers in crossing the border, or simply border crossings, was the first sector considered to be a low 
barrier by both the Finns and Russians32. No statistically significant differences between the nationality 
groups were found in the case of any sub-factors, but as figure 14 illustrates, the differences between 
the sub-factors of the group are notable and relatively clearly in order. Accordingly, notwithstanding 
the small number of variables in this groups, the very high positive correlation coefficients value (r = 
0.960, p = 0.01) may be interpreted to signal that mutual understanding of which factors in point of fact 
erect the barrier effect in this respect. 
 
Only visa procedures scored the total mean 
value higher than 4, but also customs 
officers’ treatment and attitude may be 
rounded up as an intermediate barrier. 
Within the group of the Finnish 
respondents, the largest standard deviation 
(1.638) was found in the case of 
inadequate number of check points, which 
most probably reflects the difference in the 
location of the Finnish study cities in 
relation to the check points; whereas the 
respondents from North Karelia have 
practically only one international check 
point in close proximity, the respondents 
from South Karelia can choose from two – 
or even three33 (for the location of the cities 
and border crossings, see figure 1). 
Accordingly, the intensity of border 
                                                 
32
 TM = 3.28; FIN: M = 3.13, SD = 1.005, the lowest in order; RUS: M = 3.38, SD = 1.431; 4th in order. 
33
 Even though there are only two international border crossings between South Karelia and Russia, there is another one 
between the Finnish province of Kymenlaakso and Russia, which locates fairly close to the study cities in South Karelia. 
Figure 14. Border crossings as a barrier. 
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crossings is significantly higher in the southern part of the research area, which is undeniably explained 
by a denser population in the south, but more importantly, as Ruusuvuori and Zimine (2005, 4) have 
pointed out, by its position as a traffic corridor between southern Finnish and Russian cities and ports.  
 
Altogether, the Finnish respondents perceive inadequate number of check points as a low barrier and 
their proximity as a very low barrier for interaction. From the Russian perspective the situation is 
similar, even though with slightly higher mean values and greater deviations34. Given that all the study 
cities except Petrozavodsk are located less than 75 kilometers from the closest check point, such a 
result is hardly surprising. In this case the considerably larger standard deviation of the Russian 
respondents compared to the Finnish respondents may be due to the greater locational differences of 
the study cities in relation to the border. 
6.1.7 Infrastructure as a Barrier 
Lastly, infrastructure form the lowest barrier according to the total mean value 3.177; i.e. a low barrier. 
The Finnish respondents perceive the height of the barrier in this respect to be intermediate (M 3.62, 
SD = 1.138), whereas for the Russians it is only a low barrier (M = 2.69, SD 1.473). As noted earlier 
the relatively large standard deviations are presumably due to the difference in distances to and 
proximity of the border crossing points in the different parts of the research area. For instance, the more 
detailed examination of the data reveals that the respondents from the southern part of the research area 
do not see the infrastructure or the border crossing as much as a barrier as the respondents from the 
northern part of the research area.  
 
Nonetheless, the difference between the groups is statistically significant (p = 0.002). The Russian 
respondents perceive each of the sub-factors to be lower barriers than the Finns. The ascending 
tendency, due to a high frequency of extreme low values among the Russian respondents, is illustrated 
in Figure 15. It cannot go unnoticed that it is impossible to know what actually the context of 
interpretation on the different sides is, which limits the comparability of the data. If, for instance, the 
level of infrastructure is compared with the general level of infrastructure in the respective countries, 
the cross-border connections may be perceived as weak, whereas if compared with the situation when 
the border was practically closed, the current level of infrastructure may seem substantially higher. 
Moreover, it became obvious that especially in this respect the grouping of all the Finnish respondents 
as a one groups twisted the result to a certain extent. In the southern part of the research area, for 
                                                 
34
 FIN: M = 2.72, SD = 1.638; M = 1.87, SD = 1.031. RUS: M =3.21, SD = 1.994; M 2.03, SD 1.577. 
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example, the public transportation options, i.e. bus or train, are drastically more frequent than in the 
northern part, where no railway connections for passenger traffic exist and public bus connections are 
infrequent. It was also reported that there is 
the possibility that some of the respondents 
from the northern cities were not sure 
whether to answer the question concerning 
the railway traffic in terms of passenger 
traffic or goods traffic (Matzeit & Scott 
2005, 52). Even though rail passenger 
traffic at Niirala border crossing point is 
nonexistent, goods traffic is relatively 
fluid. 
 
The remarkably strong positive correlation 
coefficient value of 0.962 (p = 0.038), 
depicted as somewhat congruently 
ascending lines in the figure, indicate the 
existence of mutual understanding between 
the Finnish and Russian respondents 
concerning the significance of the sub-
factors within the infrastructure sector. The 
large number of extreme values connotes also large standard deviations and, hence, the nationality of 
the respondent played a statistically significant role only in the responses regarding the sub-factors of 
roads (p = 0.024) and telecommunications (p = 0.003). The very same factors were also considered as 
the lowest barriers within the main sector of infrastructure. On the other hand, the inadequacy of 
railway connections and public transportations options35 undoubtedly raise the barrier higher especially 
in the case of the Finns, who rank infrastructure as the fourth highest contributor to the barrier effect, 
whereas the Russians perceive it as the lowest barrier of all the main sectors. 
 
                                                 
35
 Railways: TM = 3.84, SD = 2.233; Public transportation: TM = 3.66, SD = 1.800. 
Figure 15. Infrastructure as a barrier. 
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6.2 The Impact of Greater Interaction 
In this section, I aim to answer my second research question concerning the perceived impact of the 
greater interaction across the Finnish-Russian border. The question is tackled firstly by illuminating the 
starting point for co-operation. After that, the perceived impact of interaction is assed with the 
perceived level of both implementation and effectiveness of CBC/CBI practices. Finally, the EU’s 
impact will be shed light on. 
6.2.1 Initial Conditions 
Initial conditions set the basic guidelines for any attempt to initiate interaction across a border. It is my 
belief that greater interaction is the easiest to generate within an area that is already perceived by both 
sides as advantageous. On the other hand, factors that are perceived to highly disadvantage interaction 
should be addressed more carefully in order to transform their function from a barrier to a bridge. 
Differences between the partners do exist. The aim here is not to eliminate them up, but rather to 
recognize them, learn how to cope with them, and perhaps even envision them as advantages by using 
difference as further impetuses for future interaction initiatives.    
 
In general, as Figure 16 illustrates, the initial conditions for interaction across the Finnish-Russian 
border is perceived as slightly positive. However, a statistically significant difference (p = 0.003) 
between the two nationality groups exists. Despite a greater standard deviation, the Russian 
respondents seem to perceive the conditions as more advantageous than the Finnish respondents36, who 
have, however, a relative coherent opinion concerning the valuation of the sub-factors. 
 
The largest, and also statistically significant, differences between the groups were found in the cases of 
cultural differences (MD = 1.255, p = 0.000) as well as political differences among regional and local 
administrative frameworks in both sides of the border (MD = 1.902, p = 0.000). In both cases, the 
Russian respondents perceive them to be advantages, whereas the Finns interpret them as disadvantages 
for the CBC/CBI. For the Finns the greatest advantage is perceived to be in current relations among 
national governments, followed by those among local/ regional authorities37. In addition to these 
factors38, the Russians perceive also the existence of an ethnic minority on both sides of the border to 
be a clear advantage.  
                                                 
36
 RUS: M = 0.88, SD = 1.146; FIN: M = 0.20, SD = 0.750. 
37
 M = 5.11, SD = 1.060; M = 4.92, SD = 1.383. 
38
 Respectively: M = 5.44, SD = 1. 761; M = 5.51, SD = 1. 604; M = 5.00, SD = 1.831. 
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Figure 16. Initial conditions for CBC. Note recoded values:  -3 = serious problem in CBI, 3 = important asset in CBI. 
 
In this respect, it has to be noticed that in the Finnish border regions Russian immigrants are a 
substantial – and growing – minority compared with other minorities. In contrast, the number of 
Finnish citizens emigrating to the Russian side of the border is negligible. 
 
The finding that the relationships between the government officials and local/regional authorities are 
perceived to be the most important assets in CBC/CBI indicates that the often mentioned elitist nature 
of the co-operation is not necessarily a negative quality. Besides, keeping in mind the discussion earlier 
in section 6.1.3, it is interesting to notice that the historical event among the two countries are not at 
least perceived to harm the interaction.   
 
Whereas the Finnish respondents rank three out of nine sub-factors to be a disadvantage rather than 
advantage in CBC/CBI, the Russians perceive only linguistic differences as a problematic factor. 
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Figure 17. Images of the other. To which degree the given characteristics 
represent the other.  1=not at all, 7= to a maximum degree. 
Regardless of the slight differences, a fairly strong positive correlation (r = 0.718, p = 0.029) between 
the Finnish and Russian perspective exists. Therefore, is seems justifiable to argue that there is a 
common understanding between the two sides about the basic guidelines within which the interaction 
takes place and about the conditions from which it should strive towards mutually beneficial co-
operation.  
  
6.2.2 Images of the Other 
The rationale behind the filled radar chart in Figure 17 is to shed light on how the other is perceived as 
a partner for co-operation. For the reason that the object of perception in this case is different for the 
Finnish respondents (i.e. Russians) than it is for the Russian respondents (Finns), no statistical 
comparison between the groups has been performed. However, since all the given characteristics may 
be regarded as positive and 
desired, and the degree to which 
these characteristics are perceived 
to represent the other increases 
outwards from the center of the 
chart, the actual size and shape of 
the consequently formed colored 
area may not only be seen as an 
indicator of the significance of 
each variable per se, but it also 
signals how positive image the 
two nationality groups have of 
their other on the whole39. 
 
The difference in size between the two filled areas is clearly visible. The relative large size of the red 
area compared to the blue area indicates that the Russian respondents have a considerably more 
positive image of Finns than vice versa40. Only in the case of open minded, do the Finnish respondents 
give a more positive value of Russians as partners than vice versa.  
                                                 
39
 Note that the order of the variable axes influences the size of the filled area. Thus, the interpretations made based on the 
size of the filled area are not statistically valid in a strict sense. 
40
 RUS: M = 4.81, SD = 1.447; FIN: M = 3.88, SD =  1.090. It has been reported that some of the respondents felt reluctant 
to respond to this question, which they considered as too sensitive. 
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Even though the image of the other per se differs, it does not by any means suggest that is necessarily 
matters to a great extent. As noticed earlier, the respondents are aware that the other’s culture, 
language, religion and other characteristics are differ from theirs, but this is not perceived to be a 
serious barrier to interaction. One practical question, however, remains: will these differences present 
themselves as a problem when interaction increases?  
6.2.3 Perceptions of the Impact of Greater Interaction 
Potential greater interaction is perceived to have a strong positive impact on local economies and 
communities (Figure 18). The Russian respondents consider the impact to be slightly more positive 
than the Finnish respondents. The difference is statistically significant (p = 0.001) and no significant 
correlation between the Finnish 
and Russian responses exist. 
 
Especially collaboration among 
universities, research institutes, 
etc., cultural interactions as 
well as local exports to the 
other side of the border is 
perceived as strongly beneficial 
with relatively strong agreement 
by both nationality groups41. 
Significant differences between 
the nationality groups was 
found in the case of foreign 
investments (p = 0.000), which 
the Russian respondents value 
clearly above average, cultural 
interactions (p = 0.001), and collaboration among universities, research institutions, etc. (p = 0.022). 
In each case, the Russian respondents perceived the impact to be more positive than the Finnish 
respondents.   
 
                                                 
41
 Respectively: TM = 6.33, SD = 0.975; TM = 2.28; SD = 0.912; TM = 6.00; SD = 1.125. 
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Local exports to the
other side of the borders
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other side of the borders
Emigrants from this side
working in the other side
of the borders
Investment by local firms
in the other side of the
borders
Immigrants from the other
side working in the local
economy
Mixed marriages with
immigrants
2
Totally open borders
within a wider Europe
3.02.01.00.0-1.0-2.0-3.0
Mean
Total mean
RUS (M = 1.78)
FIN (M = 1.42)
Investment by firms
originating in the other
side of the border in the
local economy
n/a
Figure 18.  Perceptions of the greater interaction. Note recoded scale: – 3 = 
totally negative impact on local economy, 3 = highly positive impact on local 
economy 
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As the figure illustrates, none of the sub-factors within this sector of perceived impact of greater 
interaction are perceived to have a negative impact by either group of respondents. Notwithstanding the 
differences is positive level of impact or the ranking of the variables according to their perceived 
benefits, the finding may be interpreted that, in general, greater interaction is  perceived as beneficial at 
least by the actors involved in such practices. This, then, suggests an optimistic future for cross-border 
initiatives.    
6.2.4 Implementation and Effectiveness of CBC Policies. 
In general, implementation of policies of CBC is perceived to be fairly frequent and their effectiveness 
fairly high42 (Figure 19). Even though no statistically significant differences were found between the 
nationality groups in the total evaluation in either case, judged by the mean values, the implementation 
of policies was perceived slightly more positive by the Finnish respondents (M = 4.78, SD = 0.771) 
than Russian respondents (M = 4.59), who also have a greater deviation (1.197)  in their answers. 
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Local policies of c-b
cooperation
European Union policies of
c-b cooperation (funding)
Policies of cooperation in
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cooperation
Policies of cooperation
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case of natural disasters
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cooperation
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Mean
RUS Effectiveness
FIN Effectiveness
RUS Implementation
FIN Implementation
 
Figure 19. Implementation and effectiveness of CBC Policies:  a Comparative assessment. Implementation: 1=no 
policies at all, 7=very frequently implemented policies; Effectiveness: 1=not effective at all, 7=maximum 
effectiveness. 
                                                 
42
 Implementation: TM = 4.68, SD = 1.010; effectiveness: TM = 4.29, SD = 1.019. 
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The findings are similar it the case of the effectiveness of policies, in which case the Finnish 
respondents’ responses totaled the mean of 4.49 (SD = 0.742) against the Russian respondents’ mean of 
4.09 (SD = 1.207). The figure aims also to illustrate the relationship between the perceived level of 
implementation of CBC policies and their effectiveness. Despite the considerably smaller mean 
differences between the variables, the correlation coefficient value between the perceived frequency 
levels and their effectiveness of the Finnish responses (r = 0.861, p = 0.000) is only slightly stronger, 
than that of the Russians (r = 0.846, p = 0.000) ( Figure 20). The strong and statistically significant 
positive correlation indicates that implementation of policies seem to have a perceivable positive effect.  
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Figure 20. Correlations between implementation and the effectiveness of CBC policies. 
 
From the Finnish perspective, only policies of cooperation in the case of natural disasters receive mean 
values less than the intermediate value four43. At the other end, policies of co-operation in education 
and research as well as local level co-operation were perceived to have the most frequently 
implemented policies. Interestingly, however, the effectiveness of local policies of CBC seems to fall 
behind the perceived high level of its perceived implementation frequency (MD = -0.88) indicating that 
the existing local policies to enhance CBC are not being assessed to a maximum extent.  
 
Even though the correlation between the implementation and effectiveness variables was found to be 
statistically significant and fairly strongly positive also in the Russian case, there are, however, larger 
deviations in the perceived sub-factor implementation frequency and effectiveness levels as well as 
wider differences between the main variables as such. The relatively low perceived valuation of the 
effectiveness in relation to perceived frequency of implemented policies may be interpreted to indicate 
                                                 
43
 Implementation: 3.95; SD = 1.114, effectiveness: 3.82; SD = 1.048. 
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a lower satisfaction level of the usefulness of implemented policies. The situation becomes particularly 
apparent in the cases of national, regional, and local policies of CBC44.  
 
Interestingly, exactly the same sub-factors stand out when the difference in the valuation of perceived 
implementation frequency and effectiveness is compared between nationality groups. The Finnish 
respondents perceive the implementation of national, regional, and local policies significantly as more 
frequent and their effectiveness as significantly higher than the Russian respondents45. On the other 
hand, the Russian respondents perceive policies of cooperation in environmental problems, policies of 
cooperation in the case of natural disasters, and policies of cultural cooperation46 to be significantly 
more frequently implemented than the 
Finnish respondents.  
 
Given that the local level is perceived as the 
most active and efficient level in facilitating 
CBC/CBI, it may be useful to examine in 
more detail which actors are, in point of fact, 
behind this perceived efficiency. In Figure 
21, the local level actors are organized in 
order according to the total mean values for 
the reason that the statistical testing showed 
no association between the nationality of the 
respondent and the level of perceived 
activeness.  
 
Similarly to the preceding findings, 
universities and research as well as cultural 
associations were again on top, but were at 
this time passed by private citizens as the 
most active actors in the field47. Anderson’s 
                                                 
44
 Respectively: MD = -1.08, MD = -0.82, MD = -0.72. 
45
 Respectively: Implementation: p = 0.019, p = 0.028, p = 0.022; Effectiveness: p = 0.000, p = 0.001, p = 0.014. 
46
 Respectively: p = 0.046, p = 0.018, p = 0.003. 
47
 Respectively: TM = 5.35, SD = 1.055; TM = 5.31, SD = 1.279; TM 5.56, SD = 1.301. 
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FIN (M = 4.45)
Figure 21.  Activeness of local actors in CBC/CBI. 1=not active 
at all, 7=very active. 
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(2002) claim that one of the most essential perquisites for effective co-operation is the number of 
activists committed to the cause in key positions seems to be valid at least at the local level and, thus, 
this finding may be regarded to outline positive future prospect for the diversifying relations. At the 
other end, political parties are perceived to be the least active actors in enhancing CBC/CBI. 
 
Even though both the Finnish and Russian perspective correlates in a fairly strong positive manner (r = 
0.783, p = 0.001), a statistically significant difference between a number sub-factors can be found. The 
Finnish respondent perceive labor unions (p = 0.003), development agencies (p = 0.001), and networks 
of citizens (p = 0.040) significantly more active than the Russians, whereas the situation was the 
opposite in the case of private citizens (p = 0.000) and private firms (p = 0.008).  
 
All in all, the local level actors totaled a high mean value average of 4.43, which indicates a perceived 
activeness level above the intermediate value of four. Even if the local level ranked the highest when 
compared to the national and regional level, the respondents in this study seem to think that the actors’ 
activity and efficiency could still well be improved. 
6.2.5 The Benefits of Greater Interaction 
Greater interaction between Finland and Russia is perceived to have significant benefits (Figure 22). 
The mean values of both the Finnish and the Russian respondents’ responses are equal, and the testing 
proved that no statistically significant differences between the groups’ opinion exist. Furthermore, the 
values given to the sub-groups by the Finnish and the Russian respondent’s correlate in a strong 
positive manner (r = 0.905, p = 0.000)48 and only in the case of one sub-factor, the poor in the other 
country (p = 0.046) a significant difference between nationalities was found; the Russian respondents 
perceive that Finland’s poor stand to gain far greater benefits than vice versa. 
 
Nevertheless, the further examination of the calculated mean values reveals a number of interesting 
insights. From the Finnish perspective, the top three beneficiaries are our border region, the larger 
cities near the border in our side, and our country with the more or less equally high mean values49. 
                                                 
48
 Positive correlation exists, but the object in which the perceived values refer to, are different for the Finns than it is for the 
Russians. Thus, the correlation in this respect does not strictly signal a mutual understanding between the two countries, but 
rather indicates that both the Finnish and the Russian respondents valued different sub-factors in a similar manner. 
49
 Respectively: M = 5.77, SD = 1.102; M = 5, 74, SD = 0.966; M = 5.69, SD = 0.800. 
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The Russian respondents perceive the situation differently; they do not perceive that their own side 
benefits most. In fact, they agree with Finnish respondents, their top three beneficiaries being: the large 
cities near the border in the other side, the other county, and the border region in the other side50. 
Given the negligible differences, such a finding has, however, no statistical significance whatsoever. 
More importantly, all the 17 sub-variables are considered to gain at least considerable benefits and, 
hence, it seems safe to argue that greater interaction would be a desirable objective.     
 
The finding may then be confirmed with the help of statements (Figure 23). In general, the gains of the 
interaction seem to be perceived greater than losses in a very strong manner by the both sides, even 
though a statistically significant difference (p = 0.016) in the level of agreement exist. Moreover, both 
                                                 
50
 Respectively: M = 5.79; SD = 1.353; M = 5.74, SD = 1.211; M = 5.74, SD 1.326. 
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Figure 22. The perceived benefits of greater interaction between the two countries.  1 = no benefits at all, 7 = 
maximum benefits. 
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countries are perceived to benefit in a fairly equal manner, whereas there is a statistically significant 
difference (p = 0.016) in the level of agreement concerning the perceived gains by both border zones. 
Keeping in mind the earlier results, the Finnish respondents perceive the Finnish border regions to gain 
slightly greater benefits than regions on the Russian side of the border. Both sides seem to agree that 
their region gains more than their own respective country, which supports the claim that border regions 
ought not to be seen as peripheries – in the negative sense of the word – as a matter of course, but 
rather as privileged areas benefiting from their window position close to the international border.  
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Figure 23. Comparative assessment of the gains of greater interaction between the two countries. Note recoded data: 
- 3 = not at all true, 3 =absolutely true. 
 
Again, the higher mean values of the Russian responses stems mainly from the larger number of 
extreme values. As an example, in Figure 24 the situation is depicted regarding the statement: “both 
countries gain from greater interaction”.   
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Figure 24.  “Both countries gain from greater interaction”. Frequencies by nationality.
 
The most significant difference (p = 0.000) between the nationality groups can be, however, found in 
the case of statement: greater interaction causes in our region both winners and losers, with which the 
Finnish respondents seem to somewhat agree, whereas the Russians respondents disagree (Figure 25). 
Despite the differences, the perceptions of the greater interaction of the Finnish and Russian 
respondents correlate in a fairly strong positive manner (r = 0.873, p = 0.000), which suggests that a 
mutual understanding of the gains and benefits exists. 
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Figure 25. “Greater interaction causes in our region both winners and losers”. Frequencies by nationality
 77 
6.2.6 Impact of the EU 
The purpose of this last part of the analysis is to shed light on the potential impact of the EU and 
especially its enlargement. The impetus for including this chapter derives from the recent developments 
in which the co-operation has become increasingly multileveled as discussed earlier. In this respect, the 
role of the EU cannot be neglected. Finland is a member of the EU, and Russia is transforming rapidly 
from being a mere object of the EU policies into a strategic partner51. Thus, many of the co-operation 
initiatives have been supported by the Union and carried out according to its policies. On the other 
hand, Mr. Romano Prodi’s, the former President of the European Commission (1999-2004), statements 
concerning the topic function as another, more precise, impetus for the chapter (see Prodi 2001; 2002). 
 
Given that it seems to be a commonly accepted view that Russia will not become a member of the EU 
in the foreseeable future, the link between EU enlargement and the situation at the Finnish-Russian 
border may seem difficult to find. However, according to Prodi (2002) the actual accession is not the 
only game in town; the enlargement does not benefit only present and future members, but the 
neighbors also stand to benefit. “The geographical scope of this approach”, Prodi (2002) continued, “is 
our neighborhood in the literal sense of the word, our backyard” [emphasis added]. “The quality of our 
relations with them will largely depend on their performance and the political will on either side. Of 
course, geography will play a role too” (Ibid.) [Emphasis added].  
 
When, then, the impact of the EU and especially its enlargement is assessed in the similar manner as 
the greater bilateral interaction across the Finnish-Russian border, far more erratic results are found 
(Figure 26). The Finnish respondents seem to agree, at least somewhat, that the EU (M = 4.62, SD = 
1.648) is the main beneficiary of its own enlargement. The statement: “Our country gains more” is 
disagreed with to a significantly greater extent (p = 0.002) by the Russian respondents, which indicate 
that the other countries are perceived to gain more benefits. Even though the data does not enable the 
drawing of detailed conclusions, when compared with the similar chart regarding the bilateral 
interaction and co-operation between Finland and Russia, a far more hesitant mind-set towards the 
benefits of the EU enlargement may be noticed especially from the behalf of the Russian respondents. 
This could signal that for Russia, as an outsider in this respect, being a neighbor of the EU does not 
                                                 
51
 Even though the relationship between the EU and Russia is often referred to as ‘strategic partnership’, in practice it has 
never been made explicit in detail. According to Sutela (2005, 7) the existence of a strategic partnership – different from 
temporary cooperation – would seem to suggest the presence of shared values, common interests and mutual understanding.  
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axiomatically mean, as Prodi (2002) has argued, “better market opportunities in a more stable 
economic and political environment”, despite the EU’s recent ambitions to develop a zone of prosperity 
and a friendly neighborhood – a ‘ring of friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-
operative relations. A significant difference (p = 0.006) between the nationality groups is also found in 
the case of the statement: “EU enlargement causes in our region both winners and losers”, which may 
be seen to support the above reasoning. 
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Figure 26. Comparative assessment of the gains of EU enlargement. Note the recoded values: -3 = not at all true, 3 = 
absolutely true. 
 
When the actual impact of EU enlargement on CBC/CBI is being assessed, the nationality does not, 
however, have any significant association with the perceived valuation of the impact (Figure 27). Even 
though no significant correlation between the values given to the sub-variables between the Finnish and 
Russian respondents’ responses exist, in every case the mean is clearly positive.  
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Figure 27.  Impact of EU enlargement on CBC/CBI. Note recoded values:  -3 = negative, 3 positive 
 
The most positive impact is perceived to fall on policies of co-operation in education/ research 
followed by those in cultural co-operations, and those against organized crime52, all of which scored a 
mean clearly above the total mean average by both the Finnish and Russian respondents. The weakest, 
yet still positive, impact is perceived to fall on the local policies of CBC as well as on co-operation 
between local firms53. The nationality of the respondent has a significant (p = 0.012) effect on the 
valuation of the impact only in the case of national policies of CBC, which the Finnish respondents 
perceived to be noticeably more positive than the Russian respondents54.  
 
                                                 
52
 Respectively: TM = 5.22, SD = 1.281; TM = 5.22, SD = 1.402; TM = 5.16, SD = 1.431. 
53
 Respectively: TM = 4.66, SD = 1.423; TM = 4.64, SD = 1.541. 
54
 FIN: M = 5.13, SD = 1.018; RUS: M = 4.21, SD = 1.900. 
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7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has approached the gradual opening of the Finnish-Russian border from the point of view of 
the actors involved in CBC/CBI practices. It has not been my goal to gain factual knowledge about an 
objective reality by examining value-bounded perceptions of others; instead I have attempted to clarify 
how this specific group of people perceives the Finnish-Russian border and its effects. Building from 
the data available for this study, I have shed light on the respondents’ perceptions and also suggested 
the possible sources for these opinions. 
 
This study is based on the opinion of 81 individuals and, thus, the results cannot be generalized to be 
representative of the general population. Due to their professional experience and expertise, these 81 
individuals may be seen to possess knowledge that others might not have. Moreover, relying on the 
logic of Saarinen (1976), that people’s perceptions of a subject matter tend to be more exaggerated the 
further away they are from the subject in question, the actors working right at the border formed an 
ideal sample group for this study. The perceptions of these expert actors, one would hope, are the most 
likely to arrive closest to the ‘actual reality’ of situation at the Finnish-Russian border, and these 
perceptions, which cannot be proven as factual, represent the best guidance for future actions.  
 
The ‘factual’ statistics that herald the existence of a multifaceted and complex gap at the Finnish-
Russian border has not played any major role in this study. In addition to the wide differences in 
statistical systems between Finland and Russia, which makes the comparison difficult, I believe that the 
mere statistics are not adequate way to make sense of the situation at the Finnish-Russian border in any 
case. The biggest problem has been even more fundamental: we have not understood the complex 
society these statistics describe (cf. Hallikainen 2003). 
 
The concept of border, in general, and the Finnish-Russian border, in particular, are complicated topics, 
examination of which requires an approach that is holistic and flexible enough for understanding their 
multilateral meanings and representations. By relying on a social constructivist way of thinking – in its 
neo-classical sense, I have put forward an explanation of the multifaceted situation. I have attempted to 
explain a social construct, a border, and its representations with the help of socially produced 
knowledge that is gained through perception. 
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Prior to reflecting on the findings with an analytical framework, one should remember that a general 
assumption of social constructivism is that knowledge is not disinterested, apolitical, or exclusive of 
affective and embodied aspects of the human experience, but is in some sense ideological, political, and 
permeated with values (Rouse 1996). Moreover, Hall (1985, 97) has argued that we have no access to 
“the ‘real relations’ of a particular society outside of its cultural and ideological categories”. In other 
words, constructivist inquiries seek to understand contextualized meaning, to understand the 
meaningfulness of human actions and interactions – as experienced and construed by actors – in a 
given context (Greene 2003, 597). Such an aim is fundamentally based on the assumption that the 
social world does not exist independently, ‘out there’, waiting to be discovered. Rather, the emotional, 
linguistic, symbolic, interactive, and political dimensions of the social world – and their 
meaningfulness, or lack thereof – are all constructed by human actors (Ibid.). The constructions are 
influenced by specific historical, geopolitical, and cultural practices and discourses, and by the 
intensions – noble and otherwise – of those doing the constructing (Ibid, 597–598). Consequently, the 
task of the present study was not to discover lawful properties of the external world, to answer 
population representation questions, or to extract and connect observed effect with causes. Rather, the 
aim was to understand CBC actors’ constructions of meanings in the context changing role of the 
Finnish-Russian border, because it is these constructions that constitute social realities and underlie all 
human action. 
 
The task in itself was an interpretive one. Nevertheless, as an interpreter of the data, I cannot know the 
meaning of another’s life experience and consequent way of thinking. Given that my personal 
worldview has presumably influenced the constructions and representation of meaning in this particular 
context, this study has to be understood as subjectivist; my biases, experience, expertise – or lack of it – 
and insights are all part of the meanings constructed and described. For that reason, values, both the 
respondents’ of this study as well as my own, are intertwined with knowing, as knowing is intertwined 
with being and acting. As Smith (1989, 111) has discovered, there are “no fact without values, and 
different values can actually lead to different facts”. Different ‘knowers’ holding different ideas and 
values can construct different meanings, even in the same situation.   
 
In the following, the main findings are first summarized and, then, discussed and reflected upon using 
the analytical framework of this study as well as the recent EXLINEA result by others. 
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7.1 The Main Findings 
7.1.1 The Finnish-Russian Border as a Barrier 
From the point of view of the respondents, the Finnish-Russian border is perceived as an intermediate 
barrier for interaction. Given that the border used to be practically closed, it can be argued that a 
significant change has occurred during the last two decades. It became, however, apparent that the role 
of the border as a barrier is perceived as much higher in the case of some factors than in others. The 
pre-given sector of trade conditions is perceived to be the highest barrier in total, followed by general 
conditions, level of assistance, and economic geography, all of which are perceived as intermediate 
barriers. In the case of trade conditions, the opinion of both the Finnish and Russian respondents is 
close to analogous, whereas a significant differences between the nationality groups can be found in the 
case of general conditions and economic geography, which the Finnish respondents rank higher than 
the Russians, and level of assistance, which form a higher barrier for the Russians than the Finns. Of 
the six sectors, only border crossings and infrastructure are perceived as low barriers in total. Here, a 
statistically significant difference is found in the case of infrastructure, which the Finnish respondents 
perceive to form a higher barrier for interaction than the Russian respondents.  
 
The differences between the Finnish and Russian perceptions become more apparent when all the 
variables are analyzed individually. In Table 3, all the sub-factors that are perceived to be high barriers 
for CBC/CBI (M < 4.5), are listed according to nationality groups. 
 
Table 3. The highest barriers for CBC/CBI, (mean). 
FINNISH RESPONDENTS RUSSIAN RESPONDENTS 
1. Frequent changing of the rules in business (5.6) 1. Insufficient national business associations’ assistance (5.5) 
2. Corruption (5.1) 2. Insufficient national agencies assistance (5.4) 
3. Security problems (4.9) 2. Insufficient local agencies assistance (5.4) 
3. Limited product differentiation of local economy (4.9) 3. Insufficient regional agencies (5.3) 
4. Quality of banking system (4.8) 4. Insufficient national government (5.2) 
5. Different Language (4.7) 5. Insufficient regional business associations’ assistance (5.1) 
6. Tariffs or duties imposed by Russia on exports (4.6) 6. Insufficient local business associations’ assistance (4.8) 
6. Low purchasing power of the nearby markets (4.6) 7. Bureaucratic procedures in imports (4.7) 
6. Different Culture (4.6) 7. Limited product differentiation of local economy (4.7) 
7. Bureaucratic procedures in imports (4.5) 7. Frequent changing of the rules in business (4.7) 
7. Technical requirements concerning exports (4.5) 7. Limited product differentiation of local economy (4.7) 
  7. Bureaucratic procedures in import (4.7) 
  8. Technical requirements concerning imports (4.5) 
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It should be mentioned that not all the factors featured here are directly related to the border per se, but 
are rather perceived at least to be caused by it and, thus, to have an influence on the formation of the 
barrier effect. It seems that the interaction across the border is mainly perceived as being hindered by 
the problems by the Russian side. From the Finnish respondents’ perspective, the main obstacles for 
interaction are frequently changing rules in business, corruption (in Russia), and security problems (in 
Russia). From the Russian respondents’ point of view, then, the level of assistance from business 
associations and agencies of various levels as well as from the national government seems to form the 
most outstanding barriers for interaction.  
 
In the other end, then, amongst the lowest obstacles (M < 3.5) to cross-border co-operation and 
interaction I have identified the following: 
Table 4. The lowest barriers for CBC/CBI, (mean). 
FINNISH RESPONDENTS RUSSIAN RESPONDENTS 
1. Closeness of check points (1.9) 1. Difficult geographical conditions in border regions (1.9) 
2. Difficult geographical conditions in border regions (2.6) 2. Closeness of check points (2.0) 
3. Inadequate number of check points (2.7) 3. Different religion (2.1) 
3. Different religion (2.7) 4. Telecommunications (2.2) 
4. Roads (3.0) 5. Roads (2.3) 
5. Insufficient local agencies assistance (3.1) 6. Large cities in Finland too far away (2.4) 
5. Insufficient regional business associations assistance (3.1) 7. Historical events (2.6) 
5. Insufficient local government assistance (3.1) 8. Different Culture (2.8) 
6. Insufficient regional agencies assistance (3.2) 9. Low purchasing power of the nearby markets in Finland (2.9) 
6. Insufficient local business associations’ assistance (3.2) 10. Political instability (3.0) 
6. Insufficient regional government assistance (3.2) 11. Inadequate number of check points (3.2) 
6. Large cities in Russia too far away (3.2) 12. Public transport (3.3) 
7. Insufficient European (international.) organizations assistance (3.3) 13. Different Language (3.3) 
7. Passport officers treatment and attitude (3.3) 14. Insufficient (in size) nearby markets in Finland (3.4) 
8. Insufficient national business associations’ assistance (3.4)   
8. Insufficient national agencies assistance (3.4)   
8. Telecommunications (3.4)   
 
 
Even though the Finnish and the Russian point of view seem to differ also when it comes to the lowest 
barriers for CBC/CBI, a number of similarities can also be found. Both sides perceive closeness of 
check points, inadequate number of check points, difficult geographical conditions, different religion, 
roads, the location of large cities the other side of the border, and telecommunications to be either low 
or even very low barriers fort interaction.    
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7.1.2 The Greater Interaction and its Impact 
Respondents perceive CBC/CBI at the Finnish-Russian border in a positive light, which is not only the 
result of successful policies and practices, but also an essential prerequisite for future development. In 
general, images of the other are mainly positive; however the Finnish respondents had a clearly more 
restrained positive image of Russians than vice versa. The study also revealed that CBC practices at the 
Finnish-Russian border have failed to realize their full potential, presumably largely due to several 
outstanding factors which are underlined as causes of a high barrier effect. While all levels on the 
whole are perceived positively by both sides, actors at the local level are perceived to be the most 
effective. From the Russian perspective, efforts at both the regional level and in particular at the 
national level are perceived to lag behind in efficiency. Furthermore, the impact of the EU, the 
newcomer in the field, is also seen in a positive light by both sides. The activeness and efficiency of the 
local level is perceived to be bolstered by private citizens, cultural associations, and universities and 
research centers. Most importantly, the potential gains of greater interaction are perceived to be greater 
than losses in both border regions and, in general, the respondents perceive that both countries stand to 
gain from interaction. 
 
7.2 The Finnish-Russian Border and Flows 
The analysis of the available data for the present study supports my first hypothesis that despite its 
gradual opening, the Finnish-Russian border is still perceived as an element of distance. As a result, it 
has various implications not only for spatial interaction, but also for the economic development of these 
border regions. The high barrier effect of trade conditions, but also of economic geography, causes the 
interaction across the border to be weaker than within each respective state. Keeping in mind that 
infrastructure has the ability to drastically alter a region’s competitive advantage, it was encouraging to 
discover that, at the other end of the spectrum, infrastructure as a sector, was ranked the lowest barrier 
of all the given main sectors. 
 
As I have attempted to prove in this study, there are various reasons for the existence of the barrier 
effect of the border. In total, none of the 42 sub-factors are perceived as very low barriers or non-
barriers to interaction. Instead, 33 sub-factors (78, 6 per cent) are perceived to function at least as an 
intermediate barrier, of which 6 (14, 3 per cent) are perceived to represent a high barrier. As discussed 
earlier in section 3.2.1, most of these factors have both monetary and temporal effects. As the list in 
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Table 3 demonstrates, not all of these factors relate strictly to the actual border per se. However, at 
some level, all of them originate from the border, which proves the point that the border ought to be 
understood as an artificial social construction rather than merely as a political line.  
 
Trade conditions, particularly bureaucratic procedures concerning foreign trade (both imports and 
exports), and technical requirements concerning both imports and exports, are among the major 
obstacles to CBC/CBI. This supports the Gierschian way of though that the Finnish-Russian border 
functions first of all as an institutional obstacle for potential economic activities. However, like most of 
the highest ranking barriers from the Russian point of view, these factors can be changed fairly easily. 
While trade obstacles can be changed by decision-makers – provided that there is the will to do so, 
corruption, security problems, and fluctuating rules in business are more deeply imbedded barriers and 
more resistant to change. From the Finnish point of view, it is precisely these factors that pose the 
highest barriers to interaction. Therefore, concentrating on these factors could yield considerable 
results. 
 
The large differences in the evaluation of the separate sub-factors, from a low barrier to a very high 
barrier, indicate that the open-closed division paints an indisputably exaggeratedly black-and-white 
portrayal of reality. The findings of the present study suggest a constant juggle between access and 
control, and support the claims by Langer (1999, 32–33) who has argued that a border may be 
permeable for some functions and impermeable for others.  
 
It should be stressed that the mere ranking of factors (Tables 3 & 4) neglects the actual differences 
between them. More often than not, the statistical testing proved that there exists a relatively strong 
mutual understanding of which factors within each main sector represent the main barriers for 
interaction and which do not. This, I strongly believe, is an important prerequisite for the future 
development of CBC towards a more intensive, mutually beneficial co-operation between equal 
partners. 
 
Due to the multifaceted nature of the Finnish-Russian border, it is likely that the regions divided by the 
border are likely to remain battlegrounds between fragmenting and cohesive forces (see Krugman 
1991). However, there seems to exist a fair amount of potential for the regions to transform from a 
national level periphery towards an international centre, if the border’s barrier effect continues to 
decline, enabling each side to expand their contacts and market area across the border. On the other 
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hand, due to the border’s status as an external EU border bulked up with the Schengen acquis, it is 
likely to continue to function as a considerable filter for the flows between Finland and Russia. 
Furthermore, as Westlund (1999, 107) has argued, technical-logistical and political-administrative 
borders are much less resistant to change than cultural-historical borders. That is to say that even if the 
political role of the border would change, its mental characteristics etched in peoples’ memories cannot 
be erased with a single political decision. Newman’s (2003, 130) argument that “the longer they 
[borders] remain in situ, the harder they are to remove or change” seems to cast doubt onto the notion 
that proximity equals interaction. 
 
Consequently, the neo-liberalist EU logic that borders are barriers and barriers are to be removed 
sounds too simple when considering the situation surrounding the Finnish-Russian border. Based on 
the interview material of the EXLINEA project, Ruusuvuori (2004) has concluded that even though 
border bureaucracy and the red-tape surrounding border crossings should be curtailed, the border itself 
must be maintained in terms of border control and visas requirements. On the other hand, some of the 
respondents said that the future opening of the border is evident, even if they themselves believe that 
the border should not be totally opened. However, notwithstanding the downplay of the historical 
aspects, the desire to maintain the barrier effect of the border at least to a certain extent, even if it 
entails perpetuating peripherality, would suggest that the raison d’être of the border is unlikely to be 
surrendered in the foreseeable future.  
 
7.3 The Finnish-Russian Border Region and Cross-Border Co-operation 
Despite the of the barrier effect of the Finnish-Russian border, the respondents held optimistic 
perceptions of both the initial conditions as well as the future prospects of CBC/CBI. Greater 
interaction is perceived to be mutually beneficial, which is the most probable reason behind the 
optimistic attitude of the actors involved. Of course, as Ruusuvuori and Zimine (2005, 4) have pointed 
out, maintaining a positive attitude is part of their job description, however their opinion is also 
encouraged by the gradually  improving conditions at the border since the early 1990s. In any case, it 
has to be borne in mind that these positive sentiments are not only the result of CBC practices, but also 
– and more importantly – their prerequisite. 
 
The border’s barrier effect has an effect on peoples’ behavior in different circumstances and on their 
perception of places and their surroundings (Hallikainen 2003, 18). This effect depends on the capacity 
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of people to cross the border, which in itself depends on the characteristics of the border (van der 
Schelde & Hœkveld 1992, 483). The characteristics of the Finnish-Russian border have created a 
barrier that, despite its increased porosity, hinders interaction.  
 
According to European Commission, the official aim of CBC is to remove barriers and other factors 
that contribute to the separation of political entities. This sounds – in itself – well reasoned and rational. 
However, in terms of the Finnish-Russian border, the profound mission of co-operation tends to be to 
overcome the negative effects of the border and develop good neighborly relations, rather than erase 
barriers completely. In the case of the Finnish-Russian border, for many, good fences really do make 
good neighbors. The openness of the border may well be an admirable objective, but it has to be borne 
in mind, as Cronberg (2003, 223) has argued, that the co-operation practices at the external border of 
the EU, characterized by a constant juggle between access and control, have to face a remarkably 
different reality from the EU’s internal borders, where the co-operation aims to build cohesion and blur 
divides. 
 
The results of this study reflect the argument that in the Finnish-Russian case, a process of 
‘hybridisation’ is taking place through the development of new transnational communities55 (see 
Matzeit 2005, 2). These communities form a link between localities on both sides of the border and 
help transcend the considerable barriers to interaction that exist between the two countries. The EU 
policies and concrete co-operation projects have aimed to reduce historical animosities, resentment, and 
negative images that have obstructed interaction in the past, often manifested as distrust and suspicion. 
The positive evaluation of historical events and the other as a partner may suggest that effective co-
operation is already taking place – even though the existing opportunities and instruments to enhance 
CBC are not, in terms of perceptions, being fully utilized.   
 
As discussed in section 3.3.2, effective CBC cannot be based only on goodwill. I believe that the 
identifying of highest and lowest barriers for CBC/CBI will help to more efficiently target future co-
operation policies and practices. As expected, differences do exist. Given that most of these differences 
are, however, perceived in a fairly positive light, I believe that it would be more useful to try to take 
them as potential starting points, rather than simply herald their ability to hinder interaction. Both 
Finnish and Russian respondents have relatively similar opinions concerning the barrier effect of the 
                                                 
55
 Euregio Karelia as a prime example.   
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border, which may be seen to indicate that there exist a general awareness of shared problems, which 
is, according to Anderson (2000, 211), the most important requirement for an effective co-operation. 
On the other hand, the fields or factors, which are perceived to be unhindered by high barrier effect, 
could, following the “go across where the fence is the lowest” logic, be utilized more effectively to 
generate co-operation. 
 
In keeping with the findings of the other EXLINEA case study regions (see Matzeit 2005, 2), the 
findings of the present study support the notion that CBC ranks high in peoples’ minds and visions. 
This also reinforces the validity of my second hypothesis. Maintaining good contacts with a former 
enemy, across a dividing line, which was once envisioned to be the battlefront of the clash of 
civilizations, seems to be a goal that is worth striving for. This is worthwhile not only for the sake of 
these two countries, but also as a contribution to region and trust building on various levels, and to 
strengthen civil society and multi-level governance (Ibid.). Accordingly, the results of the present study 
make it difficult to disagree with Matzeit’s suggestion that the creation of a favorable environment for 
the growth of CBC should remain one of the most important tasks of EU policy. 
 
7.4 People and the Construction of the Finnish-Russian Border 
Undeniably, the last two decades have fundamentally changed the role and function of the Finnish-
Russian border. Relying on the ideas of North (2005), a change depends on the ability and effectiveness 
of the societies in question to create institutions that are productive, stable, fair, broadly accepted, and – 
perhaps most importantly – flexible enough to be modified in response to feedback. In contrast to 
evolutionary theories, the key to understanding change is to comprehend the intentionality of the actors 
involved (North 2005, vii). Change is a process that is guided by the perceptions of the actors. Choices 
and decisions are made in light of those perceptions with the intent of reducing uncertainty in pursuit of 
the given goal. Thus, change is, for the most part, a deliberate process shaped by the perceptions of the 
actors on the consequences of their own actions as well as their beliefs, which are typically blended 
with their own preferences. In this respect, the role of the border as a mental construction, which is 
derived from both contemporary and historical experiences, cannot be neglected.  
 
The distinction between the Finnish and the Russian actors was made because of the belief that the 70-
year-closure of the border had a significant impact on the development of the two sides. The culture 
and society where a person comes from determines his or her performance and, thus, contributes to the 
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process of change. This in mind, perhaps surprisingly, the perspectives of the different sides were, 
however, not that different, which makes me wonder how different the two sides of the border are after 
all?  
 
Even if co-operation comprises part of what North (2005, viii-ix) refers to as the “genetic architecture 
of humans”, so is the human tendency to draw borders and build fences. The somewhat paradoxical 
finding that opening of the border and intensifying interaction is seen in a positive light, while the 
opinion that border itself should be maintained endures, denote the existence of a gap between 
intensions and outcomes. However, the finding that both sides perceive co-operation to be beneficial is 
the most important perquisite for the future development of lively interaction. This proves, as outlined 
in my third hypothesis, that in the minds of the respondents the role of the Finnish-Russian border has 
begun to transform from a great dividing line into a fuzzier zone of interaction. Mental constructions 
accumulate through time and they change slowly. Such changes can, however, be accelerated when 
people perceive new opportunities or react to new threats to their well-being.  
 
Information is filtered through the mind. Thus, practical issues from the time spent crossing the border 
to the money spent on custom tariffs or bureaucratic procedures influence the mental constructions 
individuals form to explain the world around them. We construct concepts and schemes to make sense 
of experiences that we then test and modify in light of new experiences (Schwandt 2000, 197). These 
interpretations are not, however, constructed in isolation but against a backdrop of shared 
understandings, practices, language, and such. All these factors influence conceptions of the other and 
result in various evaluations of the other’s perceived usefulness and potential as a partner for co-
operation. 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
The fundamental assertion of this study is that despite its gradual and partial opening, the Finnish-
Russian border and its side-effects function still as a barrier separating two sides from each other and 
hindering interaction between them. Given the role that the border bears, this is not, however, a purely 
negative thing. Earlier EXLINEA results have shown that a majority on both sides perceive the border 
as a necessary and useful institution that is sufficiently transparent to enable the neighboring nations to 
interact in a mutually beneficial manner (Scott & Matzeit 2006, 48). The findings of the present study 
support this conclusion.  
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In contrast to the internal borders of the EU, where CBC aims to build cohesion and blur divides, here 
on the external EU border, where the Schengen acquis also plays an important role, CBC is 
characterized by a constant juggle between access and control, and thus the barrier function of the 
border is also highly valued. Consequently, the hypothetical argument that borders are barriers and 
barriers are to be removed, which seems also to be the basis of current EU policy making, is hardly 
valid in the Finnish-Russian case, in which the old dictum that “good fences make good neighbors” 
seems still very valid.  
 
This may well be because of the border is no longer seen as a strict cut-off line, with the ability to shut-
off contacts and retain, if not generate, the mindset of repression, injustice, conflict, or even war, but 
rather as a social practice, situated within an understanding of neighborliness that recognizes and 
respects the values of the other and the contributions that it brings. The border still functions as a 
barrier, but its partial permeability allows the relations across it to be now, at last, shaped by dialog 
rather than confrontation. This dialog allows both sides of the border to gain more knowledge about 
their neighbor, which in turn fosters mutual understanding, another important prerequisite for effective 
co-operation. To be able to work together, we have to trust each other – and to be able to trust each 
other, we have to know each other. The increased dialog, and especially its perceived usefulness and 
profitableness, is the main prerequisite for further changes. In this process the border is now being 
reproduced and acquiring a new role as an area of contact. It still functions as a barrier and a filter, but 
more and more it supports cross-border activities.  
 
Even though the barrier effect of a border is most often characterized by its economic aspects, as was 
the case in this study as well, the very existence of the border undermines the postulation that market 
forces are the sole underlying mechanism behind cross-border flows. On the other hand, the border, in 
a strict sense, causes only a few constraints. More importantly, the respondents of this study perceive 
the border as a barrier because it signifies where one set of rules end and another begins. Thus, cross-
border flows reflect more than just a simple supply and demand relationship; they are impacted by a 
complex web of non-economic factors, some of which encourage diminishing the barrier effect and 
others, which reinforce it. Crossing a border is a move out of one's own, familiar culture and into a 
different and unknown one. This seems to be a relatively high barrier especially for Finnish 
respondents. The Russian respondents, then, felt that more assistance would be needed in order to 
realize CBC in its full potential.   
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When it comes to the perceptions of greater interaction, the data available for this study does not 
support claims that there exists the need for considerable healing and trust-building before true 
interaction can occur. Historical events were not perceived to be a significant barrier for interaction, but 
this finding does not by any means imply that history has lost its significance. In Finnish-Russian 
relations, history has always played a crucial role, and I believe that, at least in the background, it still 
does. The fact that we must look to the future does not imply that the past – and the valuable lessons 
learned from it – ought to be forgotten. Perhaps, the common past could even function as a further 
impetus for a future CBC projects.  
 
The Finnish-Russian border region, as border regions in general, is characterized by specific forms of 
living together, which requires tolerance and solidarity (van Houtum 1998, 1). Thus, the perception of 
the other and of interaction with the other has a significant impact on the lives of people. With this in 
mind, it was hopeful to discover that in terms of perceptions, responses revealed that things are finally 
beginning to change. The age-old stereotypes about ‘Russianness’ and ‘Finnishness’, derived from the 
past related to World War II and the era of a closed border, have, at least in the minds of respondents, 
been replaced by more positive images. The image of the other may have a significant effect on the 
maintenance of the border in people’s minds – and its amelioration is likely to open more positive 
future prospects for the CBC at the Finish-Russian border.   
 
The relationship may still be far from ideal, but at least the often used ‘once a failure, always a failure’-
mindset seems to be finally fading away creating new prospects to the gradual opening of the border to 
be latched on in its full potential. Even though I have emphasized the role of positive attitudes at the 
individual level, it is still mainly the national governments that set the framework within which co-
operation may take place. Here, the problem has been that like the nocturnal drunkard, who searches 
for his lost keys under a streetlight because that is where they are easiest to see, so both Finland and 
Russia have been looking for solutions to their common problems in the areas illuminated by their past 
practices. Even though, there has certainly been a steady increase in different kinds of initiatives for 
formal co-operation, at least a number of them have offered nothing but a ‘new wine in old bottles’. In 
this respect, the EU has brought well-needed vigour not only in form of funding but also in the 
currency of ideas. This study has shown that the EU’s capability to fuel CBC/CBI co-operation is 
perceived as successful and its impact beneficial. 
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APPENDIX 1. EXLINEA questionnaire (sections used in this study).  
THE EXTERNAL BORDERS OF EUROPE  
PROBLEMS, POLICIES, PRACTICES, PERCEPTIONS  
 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
This questionnaire is a part of a wider effort to study the evolution, problems, policies, practices and perceptions prevailing 
in the old and new external borders of the European Union. This research project is organized by the Free University of 
Berlin (Germany) with the participation of the Peipsi Center for Transboundary Cooperation (Estonia), the Nijmegen Centre 
for Border Research (The Netherlands), the University of Joensuu, Karelian Institute (Finland), the University of Tartu, 
Department of Political Science (Estonia), the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Center for Regional Studies (Hungary), the 
University of Thessaly, Department of Planning and Regional Development (Greece), and the European Institute for Regional 
and Local Development, University of Warsaw (Poland).  
 
 
IMPORTANT! The information provided in this interview is absolutely confidential and will 
be used only for statistical analysis.  
 
 
Would you like to be informed about the results of this survey? 
Yes  
  
No  
Information about the respondent  
  
Name  
Organization  
Function  
Contact Tel: e-mail: 
Name of City:  
Population  
Distance from National Capital  
Distance from closer border crossing  
City 
Distance from closer airport  
Region, NUTS II/ III  
Country  
Sex Male  Female  
Age  
Less than 12 years  University / College  
    Education 
High School  Graduate degree  
    
English  François  German  Russian  
    
The one spoken across the borders:       Yes  No  
Foreign Languages 
 
(How many:____) 
    
Never  Often  
    Have ever crossed the border? 
1-2 times  Very often  
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3. Identifying barriers to interaction and cross-border cooperation 
As Barrier is defined here any condition or action that hinders or restrict free movement and interaction of 
people, capital, products, services, ideas, etc. A ‘no barrier’ situation corresponds to crossing the borders of two 
regions belonging in the same country. 
 
3.1. INFRASTRUCTURE CONDITIONS AS A BARRIER 
1:   barrier that cannot be overcome 
7:  no barrier at all 
  Severe barrier No barrier 
311 Railways 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
312 Roads 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
313 Telecommunications 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
314 Public transport 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3.2. BARRIERS IN CROSSING THE BORDER 
1:   barrier that cannot be overcome 
7:  no barrier at all 
  Severe barrier No barrier 
321 Closeness of check points 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
322 Inadequate number of check points 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
323 Visa procedures (if any) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
324 Passport officers treatment and attitude 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
325 Customs officers treatment and attitude 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3.3. TRADE CONDITIONS AS A BARRIER 
1:   barrier that cannot be overcome 
7:  no barrier at all 
  Severe barrier No barrier 
331 Tariffs or duties imposed by the other side on exports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
332 Quotas (limited quantities) imposed on exports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
333 Bureaucratic procedures in exports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
334 Bureaucratic procedures in imports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
335 Technical requirements concerning exports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
336 Technical requirements concerning imports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3.4. LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE AS A BARRIER 
1:   barrier that cannot be overcome 
7:  no barrier at all 
  Severe barrier No barrier 
341 Insufficient local government assistance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
342 Insufficient regional government assistance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
343 Insufficient national government assistance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
344 Insufficient local business associations assistance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
345 Insufficient regional business associations assistance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
346 Insufficient national business associations assistance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
347 Insufficient local agencies assistance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
348 Insufficient regional agencies assistance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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349 Insufficient national agencies assistance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3410 Insufficient European (international) organizations assistance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3.5. GENERAL CONDITIONS AS A BARRIER  
1:   barrier that cannot be overcome 
7:  no barrier at all 
  Severe barrier No barrier 
351 Political instability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
352 Historical events 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
353 Corruption 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
354 Security problems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
355 Frequent changing of the rules in business 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
356 Exchange rate instability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
357 Quality of banking system 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
358 Inflation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
359 Different Culture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3510 Different religion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3511 Different Language 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3.6. ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AS A BARRIER  
1:   barrier that cannot be overcome 
7:  no barrier at all 
  Severe barrier No barrier 
361 Insufficient in size nearby markets in the other side 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
362 Low purchasing power of the nearby markets in the other side 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
363 Difficult geographical conditions in border regions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
364 Large cities on the other side too far away 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
365 Low quality and productivity of local firms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
366 Limited product differentiation of local economy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4. Perceptions and images of the others 
 
4.1. INITIAL CONDITIONS  
1:   serious problem in cross-border interaction 
7:  important asset in cross-border interaction 
  Problem Asset 
411 Historical events among the two countries 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
412 Cultural differences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
413 Religious differences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
414 The existence of an ethnic minority in the other side 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
415 The existence of an ethnic minority in this side 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
416 Linguistic differences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
417 Current relations among governments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
418 Current relations among local / regional authorities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
419 
Political differences among regional and local administrative frameworks 
in both sides of the border 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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4.2. IMAGES OF THE OTHER 
1:   not at all 
7:  yes to the maximum degree 
  Min Max 
421 Hard working (people on the average) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
422 Productive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
423 Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
424 Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
425 Peaceful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
426 Wealthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
427 Open minded 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
428 Disciplined 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
429 Similar to us 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4210 They have good feelings towards us 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      4211       They have a “European” culture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4.3. PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF GREATER INTERACTION 
1:   totally negative impact in local economy / society 
7:  highly positive impact on local economy / society 
  Negative Positive 
431 Totally open borders within a wider Europe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
432 Investment by local firms in the other side of the borders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
433 
Investment by firms originating in the other side of the border in the local 
economy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
434 Immigrants from the other side working in the local economy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
435 Emigrants from this side working in the other side of the borders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
436 Local exports to the other side of the borders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
437 Local imports from the other side of the borders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
438 Mixed marriages with immigrants 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
439 Cultural interactions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4310 Collaboration among universities, research institutes, etc. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. Evaluation of policies of c-b cooperation 
 
5.1. IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICIES OF CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 
1:   no policies at all 
7:  very frequently implemented policies 
  No policy Very frequent use 
511 Local policies of c-b cooperation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
512 Regional policies of c-b cooperation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
513 National policies of c-b cooperation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
514 European Union policies of c-b cooperation (funding) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
515 Infrastructure (roads, crossings, railways, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
516 Cooperation among local authorities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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517 Cooperation among local firms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
518 Policies of cooperation in environmental problems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
519 Policies of cooperation in the case of natural disasters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5110 Policies of cooperation towards organized crime 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5111 Policies of cooperation in migration issues 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5112 Policies of cultural cooperation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5113 Policies of cooperation in education / research 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5114 Trust building policies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5.2. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICIES OF CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 
1:   not effective at all 
7:  maximum effectiveness 
  Not effective Very effective 
521 Local policies of c-b cooperation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
522 Regional policies of c-b cooperation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
523 National policies of c-b cooperation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
524 European Union policies of c-b cooperation (funding) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
525 Infrastructure (roads, crossings, railways, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
526 Cooperation among local authorities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
527 Cooperation among local firms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
528 Policies of cooperation in environmental problems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
529 Policies of cooperation in the case of natural disasters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5210 Policies of cooperation towards organized crime 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5211 Policies of cooperation in migration issues 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5212 Policies of cultural cooperation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5213 Policies of cooperation in education / research 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5214 Trust building policies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5.3. LOCAL ACTORS ACTIVE IN CROSS-BORDER INTERACTION OR COOPERATION 
1:   not active at all 
7:  very active 
  Not active Very active 
531 Local administration 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
532 Regional administration 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
533 NGOs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
534 Local or regional Chambers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
535 Labor Unions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
536 Universities and Research Centers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
537 Development Agencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
538 Private firms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
539 Political parties 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5310 Private citizen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5311 Networks of citizen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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5312 Cultural Associations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5313 Minorities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5314 Other ______________________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6. Expected effects of greater c-b interaction and cooperation 
 
6.1. THE BENEFITS OF GREATER INTERACTION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES 
1:   no benefits at all 
7:  maximum benefits 
 Who benefits No benefits Max benefits 
611 Our country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
612 The other country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
613 The capital city of our country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
614 The capital city of the other country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
615 Our border region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
616 The border region in the other side 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
617 The large cities near the border in our side 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
618 The large cities near the border in the other side 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
619 The rural areas near the border in our side 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6110 The rural areas near the border in the other side 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6111 The organized crime in both countries 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6112 The rich and wealthy in this country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6113 The rich and wealthy in the other country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6114 The poor in this country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6115 The poor in the other country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6116 The political parties in power 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6117 The political parties in the opposition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6.2. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE GAINS OF GREATER INTERACTION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES 
1:   not at all true 
7:  absolutely true 
 Who gains Not true True 
621 Both countries gain from greater interaction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
622 The other country gains more 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
623 Our country gains more 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
624 Both border zones gain from greater interaction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
625 The other border zone gains more 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
626 Our border zone gains more 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
627 Our country gains more than our region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
628 Our region gains more than our country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
629 Our region and our country gain about the same 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6210 Greater interaction causes in our region both winners and losers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6211 Gains are greater than losses in our region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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6212 Losses are greater than gains in our region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6213 Gains and losses are about the same in our region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7. Expected effects of EU enlargement on the region 
 
7.1. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS OF EU ENLARGEMENT 
1:   not at all true 
7:  absolutely true 
 Who gains Not true True 
711 EU gains        
712 All countries gain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
713 The other country (countries) stand to gain more 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
714 Our country gains more 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
715 Both border zones gain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
716 The other border zone gains more 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
717 Our border zone gains more 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
718 Our country gains more than our region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
719 Our region gains more than our country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7110 Our region and our country gain about the same 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7111 EU enlargement causes in our region both winners and losers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7112 Gains are greater than losses in our region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7113 Losses are greater than gains in our region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7114 Gains and losses are about the same in our region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7.2. IMPACT OF EU ENLARGEMENT ON CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION/INTERACTION 
1:   negative  
7:  positive 
  negative positive 
721 Local policies of c-b cooperation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
722 Regional policies of c-b cooperation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
723 National policies of c-b cooperation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
724 Infrastructure (roads, crossings, railways, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
725 Cooperation among local authorities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
726 Cooperation among local firms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
727 Policies of cooperation in environmental problems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
728 Policies of cooperation in the case of natural disasters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
729 Policies of cooperation towards organized crime 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7210 Policies of cooperation in migration issues 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7211 Policies of cultural cooperation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7212 Policies of cooperation in education / research 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7213 Trust building in the cross-border region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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APPENDIX 2. Profiles of Respondents. 
 
    
FIN 
North 
Karelia  
South 
Karelia  
RUS Vyborg  Svetogorsk Sortavala Petrozavodsk  
TOTAL NUMBER 39 20 19 56 15 6 11 10 
 Males 28 14 14 22 6 4 5 9 
 Females 11 6 5 0 9 2 6 1 
EDUCATION         
 Vocational 5 3 2 68 1 - 3 - 
 University 34 17 17 0 14 6 8 10 
LANGUAGE 
PROFICIENCY 
        
 English 29 11 18 4 13 2 4 6 
 French 2 1 1 32 1 1 - 1 
 German 16 7 9 38 2 - 1 1 
 Russian 19 8 11 76 15 6 9 10 
 Finnish 38 19 19 42 4 1 3 4 
 Swedish 21 9 12 4 2 - - - 
 Karelian 2 1 1 14 - - - - 
 None 7 6 1 0 2 4 6 2 
CROSS-BORDER 
TRIPS 
        
 Never 1 1 0 4 1 - 2 - 
 Seldom 2 1 1 20 2 - 2 5 
 Often 10 7 3 52 4 - 3 2 
 Very Often 26 11 15 144 8 6 4 3 
AVERAGE AGE 48 49 47 0 41 39 39 41 
          
 Public sector 26 12 14      
 Private sector 7 4 3      
  NGOs/observers 6 4 2           
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APPENDIX 3.  Sub-factor statistics. EXLINEA questions 311-366.  
 
Statistically significant p-values in bold. One asterisk (*) attached to the value indicates a significance 
level of p =≤ 0.05, two asterisks (**) indicate p = ≤ 0.01, and three asterisks (***) indicate p = ≤ 0.001. 
M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation, Mo = Mode, m = Median. 
 
    FINNISH RUSSIAN TOTAL 
#  M SD Mo m M SD Mo m M SD Mo m Sig. 
311 Railways 4.21 1.877 6 4 3.49 2.491 1 2 3.84 2.233 1 4 0.148 
312 Roads 3.03 1.328 4 3 2.26 1.639 1 2 2.63 1.537 1 2 0.024(*) 
313 Telecommunications 3.38 1.515 4 4 2.25 1.808 1 1 2.81 1.755 1 3 0.003(**) 
314 Public transport 4.03 1.564 4 4 3.32 1.955 5 4 3.66 1.8 5 4 0.077 
321 Closeness of check points 1.87 1.031 2 2 2.03 1.577 1 1 1.95 1.329 1 1 0.61 
322 Inadequate number of check points 2.72 1.638 2 2 3.21 1.994 1 3 2.98 1.837 1 3 0.223 
323 Visa procedures (if any) 4.15 1.309 4 4 4.12 2.265 1 4 4.14 1.856 4 4 0.932 
324 Passport officers treatment and attitude 3.28 1.413 2 3 3.66 2.117 1 4 3.48 1.807 2 3 0.351 
325 Customs officers treatment and attitude 3.46 1.466 2 3 4 1.835 5 4 3.74 1.679 4 4 0.15 
331 
Tariffs or duties imposed by the other side on 
exports 4.63 1.125 5 5 4.03 1.723 4 4 4.34 1.465 4 4 0.079 
332 Quotas (limited quantities) imposed on exports 4.18 1.312 4 4 3.97 1.774 4 4 4.08 1.543 4 4 0.56 
333 Bureaucratic procedures in exports 4.69 1.173 5 5 4.43 1.642 4 4 4.57 1.417 4 5 0.428 
334 Bureaucratic procedures in imports 4.49 1.315 6 5 4.67 1.691 6 5 4.58 1.508 6 5 0.602 
335 Technical requirements concerning exports 4.46 1.211 5 5 4.33 1.586 4 4 4.4 1.395 5 5 0.694 
336 Technical requirements concerning imports 4.33 1.264 5 4 4.53 1.63 4 4.5 4.43 1.444 4 4 0.564 
341 Insufficient local government assistance 3.13 1.472 2 3 3.54 1.938 3 3 3.34 1.728 2 3 0.291 
342 Insufficient regional government assistance 3.23 1.404 2 3 4.25 1.822 3 4 3.75 1.698 5 3 0.007(**) 
343 Insufficient national government assistance 3.64 1.386 4 4 5.15 1.755 7 6 4.4 1.746 4 4 0.000(***) 
344 Insufficient local business associations assistance 3.19 1.351 3 3 4.76 1.953 7 5 3.93 1.828 3 3.5 0.000(***) 
345 
Insufficient regional business associations 
assistance 3.14 1.378 3 3 5.09 1.91 7 6 4.06 1.91 3 4 0.000(***) 
346 
Insufficient national business associations 
assistance 3.44 1.297 3 3 5.53 1.665 7 6 4.43 1.806 3 4 0.000(***) 
347 Insufficient local agencies assistance 3.14 1.182 3 3 5.43 1.832 7 6 3.97 1.816 3 4 0.000(***) 
348 Insufficient regional agencies assistance 3.19 1.288 4 3 5.35 1.872 6 6 3.95 1.827 4 4 0.000(***) 
349 Insufficient national agencies assistance 3.35 1.274 4 3 5.45 1.791 6 6 4.09 1.776 4 4 0.000(***) 
3410 
Insufficient European (international) organizations 
assistance 3.32 1.292 4 3 3.92 1.797 5 4 3.63 1.59 4 4 0.101 
351 Political instability 4.34 1.192 5 5 3.05 1.86 1 3 3.66 1.698 5 4 0.000(***) 
352 Historical events 3.71 1.063 4 4 2.6 1.654 1 2 3.13 1.504 4 3 0.001(***) 
353 Corruption 5.13 1.128 6 5 4.4 1.878 5 5 4.76 1.587 5 5 0.040(*) 
354 Security problems 4.9 1.294 6 5 4.17 1.716 4 4 4.53 1.559 5 5 0.036(*) 
355 Frequent changing of the rules in business 5.56 1.021 2 6 4.73 1.45 5 3 5.14 1.319 6 5 0.004(**) 
356 Exchange rate instability 3.74 1.083 4 4 3.61 1.773 3 5 3.67 1.474 4 4 0.7 
357 Quality of banking system 4.82 1.167 5 5 4.05 1.802 4 4 4.43 1.565 5 5 0.025(*) 
358 Inflation 4.21 1.26 5 4 3.8 1.833 2 4 4 1.583 5 4 0.257 
359 Different Culture 4.59 1.117 5 5 2.83 1.71 1 2 3.68 1.694 5 4 0.000(***) 
3510 Different religion 2.66 1.419 2 2 2.1 1.543 1 1.5 2.36 1.503 1 2 0.095 
3511 Different Language 4.67 1.42 5 5 3.31 1.893 1 3 3.96 1.806 5 4 0.000(***) 
361 Insufficient in size nearby markets in the other side 3.77 1.842 5 4 3.39 1.853 1 4 3.58 1.845 5 4 0.377 
362 
Low purchasing power of the nearby markets in the 
other side 4.64 1.46 6 5 2.94 1.705 1 3 3.85 1.785 5 4 0.000(***) 
363 Difficult geographical conditions in border regions 2.61 1.285 2 2 1.85 1.574 1 1 2.22 1.482 1 2 0.029(*) 
364 Large cities on the other side too far away 3.18 1.291 2 3 2.4 1.868 1 1.5 2.84 1.608 2 2 0.056 
365 Low quality and productivity of local firms 4.41 1.332 5 5 4 2.168 1 4 4.2 1.81 5 5 0.309 
366 Limited product differentiation of local economy 4.87 0.963 5 5 4.69 2.018 7 5 4.78 1.599 5 5 0.611 
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APPENDIX 4.  Sub-factor statistics. EXLINEA questions 411-7213. 
 
Statistically significant p-values in bold. One asterisk (*) attached to the value indicates a significance 
level of p =≤ 0.05, two asterisks (**) indicate p = ≤ 0.01, and three asterisks (***) indicate p = ≤ 0.001. 
 
Initial Conditions.                 
#     N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
FIN 39 4 1.298 0.208 411 Historical events among the two countries 
RUS 36 4.5 1.89 0.315 
0.19 -0.5 0.377 
FIN 38 3.42 0.976 0.158 412 Cultural differences 
RUS 34 4.68 1.683 0.289 
0.000(***) -1.255 0.32 
FIN 38 4.68 1.118 0.181 
413 Religious differences 
RUS 29 4.66 1.798 0.334 
0.936 0.029 0.358 
FIN 37 4.38 1.114 0.183 
414 The existence of an ethnic minority in the other side 
RUS 38 5 1.831 0.297 
0.081 -0.622 0.351 
FIN 39 4.74 1.251 0.2 
415 The existence of an ethnic minority in this side 
RUS 32 5.41 1.663 0.294 
0.068 -0.663 0.356 
FIN 38 3 1.115 0.181 
416 Linguistic differences 
RUS 36 3.61 1.856 0.309 
0.088 -0.611 0.354 
FIN 38 5.11 1.06 0.172 
417 Current relations among governments 
RUS 41 5.44 1.761 0.275 
0.315 -0.334 0.33 
FIN 38 4.92 1.383 0.224 
418 Current relations among local / regional authorities 
RUS 39 5.51 1.604 0.257 
0.087 -0.592 0.341 
FIN 38 3.13 0.875 0.142 
419 
Political differences among regional and local 
administrative frameworks in both sides of the border RUS 30 5.03 1.671 0.305 
0.000(***) -1.902 0.314 
          
Perceptions about the Impact of Greater Interaction.         
FIN 38 n/a n/a n/a 
431 Totally open borders within a wider Europe 
RUS 39 5.28 1.835 0.294 
n/a n/a n/a 
FIN 39 5.21 0.864 0.138 
432 
Investment by local firms in the other side of the 
borders RUS 40 5.43 1.678 0.265 
0.468 -0.22 0.301 
FIN 38 4.79 1.234 0.2 
433 
Investment by firms originating in the other side of the 
border in the local economy RUS 41 6.46 0.84 0.131 
0.000(***) -1.674 0.236 
FIN 39 5.1 0.912 0.146 
434 
Immigrants from the other side working in the local 
economy RUS 40 4.95 1.921 0.304 
0.655 0.153 0.34 
FIN 39 5.44 0.821 0.131 
435 
Emigrants from this side working in the other side of 
the borders RUS 42 5.4 1.578 0.244 
0.913 0.031 0.283 
FIN 39 5.79 1.056 0.169 
436 Local exports to the other side of the borders 
RUS 41 6.2 1.167 0.182 
0.111 -0.4 0.249 
FIN 39 5.49 0.97 0.155 
437 Local imports from the other side of the borders 
RUS 41 5.63 1.445 0.226 
0.597 -0.147 0.277 
FIN 38 4.89 1.331 0.216 
438 Mixed marriages with immigrants 
RUS 41 5.44 1.598 0.25 
0.103 -0.544 0.33 
FIN 39 5.95 0.944 0.151 
439 Cultural interactions 
RUS 42 6.6 0.767 0.118 
0.001(***) -0.647 0.192 
FIN 39 6.08 0.984 0.158 
4310 
Collaboration among universities,  research institutes, 
etc. RUS 42 6.57 0.914 0.141 
0.022(*) -0.495 0.211 
          
Implementation of CBC Policies.         
FIN 38 5.26 1.245 0.202 511 Local policies of c-b cooperation 
RUS 38 4.34 2.134 0.346 
0.024(*) 0.921 0.401 
FIN 38 5.05 1.184 0.192 
512 Regional policies of c-b cooperation 
RUS 38 4.24 1.909 0.31 
0.028(*) 0.816 0.364 
FIN 39 4.51 1.295 0.207 
513 National policies of c-b cooperation 
RUS 38 3.68 1.71 0.277 
0.019(*) 0.829 0.346 
FIN 38 4.89 1.134 0.184 
514 European Union policies of c-b cooperation (funding) 
RUS 35 4.74 1.559 0.264 
0.638 0.152 0.321 
FIN 37 4.68 1.132 0.186 
515 Infrastructure (roads, crossings, railways, etc.) 
RUS 37 4.41 1.624 0.267 
0.409 0.27 0.325 
FIN 39 5.21 1.151 0.184 
516 Cooperation among local authorities 
RUS 37 5.19 1.713 0.282 
0.962 0.016 0.333 
FIN 38 4.71 1.063 0.172 
517 Cooperation among local firms 
RUS 40 4.5 1.432 0.226 
0.465 0.211 0.287 
FIN 38 4.34 1.321 0.214 
518 Policies of cooperation in environmental problems 
RUS 37 5.08 1.785 0.294 
0.046(*) -0.739 0.363 
FIN 38 3.95 1.114 0.181 
519 Policies of cooperation in the case of natural disasters 
RUS 35 4.8 1.828 0.309 
0.018(*) -0.853 0.351 
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FIN 37 4.84 1.068 0.176 
5110 Policies of cooperation towards organized crime 
RUS 36 4.36 1.641 0.274 
0.145 0.477 0.323 
FIN 38 4.05 1.089 0.177 
5111 Policies of cooperation in migration issues 
RUS 36 4.03 1.781 0.297 
0.942 0.025 0.341 
FIN 39 5.15 0.961 0.154 
5112 Policies of cultural cooperation 
RUS 39 5.95 1.276 0.204 
0.003(**) -0.795 0.256 
FIN 39 5.33 0.955 0.153 
5113 Policies of cooperation in education / research 
RUS 40 5.43 1.375 0.217 
0.732 -0.092 0.267 
FIN 38 4.61 1.079 0.175 
5114 Trust building policies 
RUS 39 4.59 1.846 0.296 
0.964 0.016 0.346 
          
Effectiveness of CBC Policies         
FIN 39 4.44 1.119 0.179 
521 
Local policies of c-b cooperation 
RUS 36 3.61 1.695 0.282 
0.014(*) 0.825 0.329 
FIN 39 4.56 1.142 0.183 
522 
Regional policies of c-b cooperation 
RUS 36 3.42 1.628 0.271 
0.001(***) 1.147 0.323 
FIN 39 4.46 1.189 0.19 
523 
National policies of c-b cooperation 
RUS 35 2.6 1.376 0.233 
0.000(***) 1.862 0.301 
FIN 39 4.69 1.217 0.195 
524 
European Union policies of c-b cooperation (funding) 
RUS 36 4.14 1.588 0.265 
0.097 0.553 0.329 
FIN 38 4.58 1.154 0.187 
525 
Infrastructure (roads, crossings, railways, etc.) 
RUS 37 3.92 1.689 0.278 
0.053 0.66 0.335 
FIN 39 4.79 1.321 0.212 
526 
Cooperation among local authorities 
RUS 37 4.19 1.63 0.268 
0.08 0.606 0.341 
FIN 39 4.59 1.044 0.167 
527 
Cooperation among local firms 
RUS 37 4.27 1.387 0.228 
0.259 0.319 0.281 
FIN 39 4.13 1.128 0.181 
528 
Policies of cooperation in environmental problems 
RUS 37 4.7 1.648 0.271 
0.079 -0.574 0.322 
FIN 39 3.82 1.048 0.168 
529 
Policies of cooperation in the case of natural disasters 
RUS 34 4.47 1.911 0.328 
0.071 -0.65 0.355 
FIN 39 4.33 1.264 0.202 
5120 
Policies of cooperation towards organized crime 
RUS 35 3.89 1.762 0.298 
0.21 0.448 0.354 
FIN 39 4.1 1.142 0.183 
5121 
Policies of cooperation in migration issues 
RUS 35 3.89 1.676 0.283 
0.514 0.217 0.331 
FIN 39 5 0.858 0.137 
5122 
Policies of cultural cooperation 
RUS 37 5.54 1.502 0.247 
0.056 -0.541 0.279 
FIN 39 5 1.026 0.164 
5123 
Policies of cooperation in education / research 
RUS 37 5 1.616 0.266 
1 0 0.309 
FIN 39 4.36 1.203 0.193 
5124 
Trust building policies 
RUS 36 4.11 1.687 0.281 
0.47 0.248 0.341 
          
Local actors active in CBC/CBI.         
FIN 39 4.82 1.449 0.232 
531 Local administration 
RUS 38 4.79 2.069 0.336 
0.939 0.031 0.406 
FIN 38 4.71 1.271 0.206 
532 Regional administration 
RUS 38 4.53 1.656 0.269 
0.588 0.184 0.339 
FIN 39 4.95 1.123 0.18 
533 NGOs 
RUS 41 5.05 1.516 0.237 
0.737 -0.1 0.297 
FIN 38 4.58 1.056 0.171 
534 Local or regional Chambers 
RUS 36 4.11 1.635 0.272 
0.146 0.468 0.318 
FIN 38 3.63 1.051 0.17 
535 Labor Unions 
RUS 35 2.71 1.467 0.248 
0.003(**) 0.917 0.297 
FIN 39 5.44 0.995 0.159 
536 Universities and Research Centers 
RUS 39 5.26 1.117 0.179 
0.456 0.179 0.24 
FIN 38 4.95 1.432 0.232 
537 Development Agencies 
RUS 26 3.54 1.581 0.31 
0.001(***) 1.409 0.387 
FIN 39 4.44 1.314 0.21 
538 Private firms 
RUS 42 5.24 1.322 0.204 
0.008(**) -0.802 0.293 
FIN 39 2.87 1.151 0.184 
539 Political parties 
RUS 35 2.46 1.669 0.282 
0.214 0.415 0.33 
FIN 39 5 1.026 0.164 
5310 Private citizen 
RUS 41 6.1 1.319 0.206 
0.000(***) -1.098 0.264 
FIN 38 4.5 1.247 0.202 
5311 Networks of citizen 
RUS 37 3.76 1.786 0.294 
0.040(*) 0.743 0.355 
FIN 39 5.13 0.951 0.152 
5312 Cultural Associations 
RUS 41 5.49 1.519 0.237 
0.211 -0.36 0.285 
FIN 39 4.26 1.551 0.248 
5313 Minorities 
RUS 35 3.86 1.881 0.318 
0.326 0.399 0.403 
FIN 2 4.5 2.121 1.5 
5314 Other 
RUS 9 5.11 2.088 0.696 
0.758 -0.611 1.654 
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The Benefits of Greater Interaction.         
FIN 35 5 1.057 0.179 
x EU 
RUS 41 5.02 1.508 0.236 
0.934 -0.024 0.296 
FIN 39 5.69 0.8 0.128 
611 Our country 
RUS 42 5.29 1.419 0.219 
0.12 0.407 0.296 
FIN 39 5.56 0.995 0.159 
612 The other country 
RUS 42 5.74 1.211 0.187 
0.481 -0.174 0.246 
FIN 38 4.63 1.239 0.201 
613 The capital city of our country 
RUS 38 4.71 1.944 0.315 
0.833 -0.079 0.374 
FIN 38 4.45 1.288 0.209 
614 The capital city of the other country 
RUS 38 4.74 1.811 0.294 
0.425 -0.289 0.361 
FIN 39 5.77 1.012 0.162 
615 Our border region 
RUS 40 5.45 1.3 0.206 
0.228 0.319 0.263 
FIN 39 5.59 1.141 0.183 
616 The border region in the other side 
RUS 42 5.74 1.326 0.205 
0.59 -0.148 0.274 
FIN 39 5.74 0.966 0.155 
617 The large cities near the border in our side 
RUS 41 5.59 1.449 0.226 
0.569 0.158 0.277 
FIN 39 5.33 1.243 0.199 
618 The large cities near the border in the other side 
RUS 42 5.79 1.353 0.209 
0.121 -0.452 0.288 
FIN 39 4.33 1.383 0.221 
619 The rural areas near the border in our side 
RUS 41 4.1 2.071 0.323 
0.553 0.236 0.396 
FIN 39 4.38 1.498 0.24 
6110 The rural areas near the border in the other side 
RUS 40 4.38 1.917 0.303 
0.98 0.01 0.387 
FIN 36 4.81 1.564 0.261 
6111 The organized crime in both countries 
RUS 40 4.63 1.69 0.267 
0.63 0.181 0.373 
FIN 38 4.89 1.247 0.202 
6112 The rich and wealthy in this country 
RUS 37 5.38 1.705 0.28 
0.164 -0.484 0.344 
FIN 38 5.32 0.873 0.142 
6113 The rich and wealthy in the other country 
RUS 38 4.84 1.824 0.296 
0.153 0.474 0.328 
FIN 39 4 1.451 0.232 
6114 The poor in this country 
RUS 42 3.69 2.066 0.319 
0.441 0.31 0.4 
FIN 39 3.79 1.657 0.265 
6115 The poor in the other country 
RUS 42 4.64 2.07 0.319 
0.046(*) -0.848 0.419 
FIN 38 3.55 1.483 0.241 
6116 The political parties in power 
RUS 36 3.47 2.035 0.339 
0.846 0.08 0.412 
FIN 38 3.29 1.45 0.235 
6117 The political parties in the opposition 
RUS 34 2.97 1.766 0.303 
0.409 0.319 0.384 
                    
Comparative Assessment of the Gains of Greater Interaction between the Two Countries           
FIN 39 5.79 0.864 0.138 
621 Both countries gain from greater interaction 
RUS 36 5.89 1.703 0.284 
0.761 -0.094 0.308 
FIN 39 4.26 1.517 0.243 
622 The other country gains more 
RUS 37 4.54 2.116 0.348 
0.502 -0.284 0.421 
FIN 38 4.42 1.407 0.228 
623 Our country gains more 
RUS 34 3.71 1.993 0.342 
0.081 0.715 0.403 
FIN 38 5.32 1.254 0.203 
624 Both border zones gain from greater interaction 
RUS 38 6.11 1.521 0.247 
0.016(*) -0.789 0.32 
FIN 38 4.39 1.603 0.26 
625 The other border zone gains more 
RUS 35 3.94 2.1 0.355 
0.308 0.452 0.44 
FIN 38 4.03 1.461 0.237 
626 Our border zone gains more 
RUS 34 4 2.118 0.363 
0.951 0.026 0.425 
FIN 38 3.11 1.331 0.216 
627 Our country gains more than our region 
RUS 37 3.68 2.484 0.408 
0.217 -0.57 0.458 
FIN 38 4.87 1.339 0.217 
628 Our region gains more than our country 
RUS 36 4.53 2.408 0.401 
0.451 0.341 0.45 
FIN 38 3.71 1.505 0.244 
629 Our region and our country gain about the same 
RUS 32 2.91 2.069 0.366 
0.065 0.804 0.428 
FIN 34 4.5 1.542 0.265 
6210 
Greater interaction causes in our region both winners 
and losers RUS 36 2.75 2.17 0.362 
0.000(***) 1.75 0.452 
FIN 38 5.55 1.245 0.202 
6211 Gains are greater than losses in our region 
RUS 37 6.24 1.188 0.195 
0.016(*) -0.691 0.281 
FIN 38 2.24 1.149 0.186 
6212 Losses are greater than gains in our region 
RUS 34 1.97 1.403 0.241 
0.385 0.266 0.304 
FIN 36 2.92 1.538 0.256 
6213 Gains and losses are about the same in our region 
RUS 32 2.13 1.621 0.287 
0.044(*) 0.792 0.384 
          
Comparative Assessment of the impacts of EU enlargement.         
FIN 39 4.62 1.648 0.264 
711 EU 
RUS 36 3.81 2.266 0.378 
0.084 0.81 0.461 
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FIN 39 4.62 1.648 0.264 
712 All countries gain 
RUS 36 3.81 2.266 0.378 
0.084 0.81 0.461 
FIN 37 3.81 1.777 0.292 
713 The other country (countries) stand to gain more 
RUS 34 4.44 2.149 0.369 
0.185 -0.63 0.47 
FIN 37 3.7 1.372 0.225 
714 Our country gains more 
RUS 33 2.61 1.836 0.32 
0.006(**) 1.097 0.385 
FIN 38 4.21 1.51 0.245 
715 Both border zones gain 
RUS 31 4.1 2.3 0.413 
0.806 0.114 0.461 
FIN 37 3.86 1.751 0.288 
716 The other border zone gains more 
RUS 33 4.09 2.097 0.365 
0.628 -0.226 0.465 
FIN 37 3.59 1.322 0.217 
717 Our border zone gains more 
RUS 35 2.97 2.189 0.37 
0.146 0.623 0.424 
FIN 39 4.28 1.589 0.254 
718 Our country gains more than our region 
RUS 30 4.1 2.203 0.402 
0.704 0.182 0.476 
FIN 38 3.61 1.794 0.291 
719 Our region gains more than our country 
RUS 30 3.2 2.219 0.405 
0.42 0.405 0.499 
FIN 37 3.46 1.386 0.228 
7110 Our region and our country gain about the same 
RUS 27 2.7 1.918 0.369 
0.072 0.756 0.413 
FIN 36 4.31 1.451 0.242 
7111 
EU enlargement causes in our region both winners and 
losers RUS 33 2.91 2.112 0.368 
0.002(**) 1.396 0.433 
FIN 38 4.53 1.37 0.222 
7112 Gains are greater than losses in our region 
RUS 31 3.94 2.144 0.385 
0.17 0.591 0.426 
FIN 38 3.16 1.386 0.225 
7113 Losses are greater than gains in our region 
RUS 30 3.07 1.837 0.335 
0.822 0.091 0.404 
          
Impact of EU Enlargement on CBC/CBI.         
FIN 39 4.79 1.281 0.205 
721 Local policies of c-b cooperation 
RUS 31 4.48 1.61 0.289 
0.384 0.311 0.355 
FIN 38 5.03 1.052 0.171 
722 Regional policies of c-b cooperation 
RUS 32 4.44 1.684 0.298 
0.079 0.589 0.33 
FIN 38 5.13 1.018 0.165 
723 National policies of c-b cooperation 
RUS 33 4.21 1.9 0.331 
0.012(*) 0.919 0.355 
FIN 39 4.87 1.196 0.192 
724 Infrastructure (roads, crossings, railways, etc.) 
RUS 35 4.8 1.891 0.32 
0.844 0.072 0.364 
FIN 39 4.72 1.255 0.201 
725 Cooperation among local authorities 
RUS 31 4.58 1.822 0.327 
0.711 0.137 0.368 
FIN 38 4.89 1.06 0.172 
726 Cooperation among local firms 
RUS 34 4.35 1.921 0.329 
0.137 0.542 0.361 
FIN 38 4.97 1.052 0.171 
727 Policies of cooperation in environmental problems 
RUS 33 4.94 1.694 0.295 
0.918 0.034 0.33 
FIN 38 4.63 1.149 0.186 
728 Policies of cooperation in the case of natural disasters 
RUS 30 4.93 1.911 0.349 
0.423 -0.302 0.374 
FIN 37 5.16 1.191 0.196 
729 Policies of cooperation towards organized crime 
RUS 31 5.16 1.695 0.304 
0.998 0.001 0.351 
FIN 38 4.76 1.025 0.166 
7210 Policies of cooperation in migration issues 
RUS 28 4.75 1.936 0.366 
0.972 0.013 0.369 
FIN 39 5.1 0.995 0.159 
7211 Policies of cultural cooperation 
RUS 30 5.37 1.81 0.33 
0.442 -0.264 0.342 
FIN 39 5.49 0.942 0.151 
7212 Policies of cooperation in education / research 
RUS 31 5.39 1.626 0.292 
0.748 0.1 0.31 
FIN 38 4.92 1.148 0.186 
7213 Trust building in the cross-border region 
RUS 30 4.87 1.943 0.355 
0.886 0.054 0.378 
 
 
 
 
